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Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule
of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud,
and September 11, 2001
Faith Stevelman Kahn.
Both AI Qaeda s attacks and Enron s collapse ~re the tragic products ofantidemocratic
extremism-Islamic fimdamentalism in the Fonner case and "market fimdamentalism" in the
latter. The US. government has responded to the threat posed by Islamic extremists with a
military response and increased attention to heightenedphysical security. At a conceptual level,
AI Qaeda s destruction ofthe self-proclaimed Centers ofWOrld Trade forces us to consider what
it u~ that made this icon ofthe markets, fivm the terrorists' perspective, "worth" bombing?
And Jiom the perspective ofAmerican liee market ideology, in contrast, what in the values and
~)'Stems of organization that animate capital markets and corporate !inns merits a vigorous,
n~hement defense?
The corporate financial accounting and white-collar crime scandals erupting onto the
national landscape, seemingly continuously, in the spring and summer of2002, have revealed a
different but similarly virulent threat posed by disdain for democratic government, liberal
values, and the rule of Jaw. Since the Reagan era, a radically privatist, generally "antilaw;"
"greed is good" ideology has pervaded not only the culture andpractices ofbusiness and Wall
Street, but even government itselfand legal academia. The latter is illustrated, for example, by
the nearly wholesale embrace ofthe methodology and values ofneoclassical economic science
by many elite corporate legal scholars.
Enron s poses a threefold challenge to law refonners. First, this challenge encompasses
crafting an appropriate legal response to the financial conflicts ofinterest that have broadly
eroded the checks and balances intended to protect shareholders' and, ultimately, the publics
interests. Second, attention must be directed to restoring the eroded architecture offederal and
fiduciary antiliaudprotection. Finally, the profound social haan caused by corporate Jiaud and
insider secretprofit taking challenge government, legal academia, and the business community
itself to reinvest corporate "govemance" and the commitment to ''fiee" markets with the
democratic, egalitarian values, guarantees ofopportunitx and protections against opportunism
implied by the notions of ''govemance" and ''fiee" markets. Corporate ''disinfonnation" is
incompatible with meritocratic values, the promise of democratic accountabili[X and the
commitment to persona/liberty that must continue to inhabit the American corporate, capitalist
economy if it is to reassume its historic strength and durability. These are the values that
American soldiers are fighting for in foreign lands, and the values that are being tested in the
manypublic andprivate sector ''corporate responsibility''initiatives being adopted and explored
post-Enron.

* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I would like to thank Martha A.
Fineman and Cornell's Feminist Legal Theory Workshop on Corporations and Capitalism, the
Baldy Center of the University of Buffalo Law School, the Sloan Foundation, New York Law
School, Terry O'Neill, Lynne Dallas, and the organizers of this Symposium for their support
of this research. In addition, many thanks are due to Professor Mark Glassman, for his
thoughtfulness and support of this project, Sarah Valentine and New York Law School's other
expert research librarians, and Tulane Law School graduate, Thomas Owen. Having first
received this Article in March 2002, the changes required to be made herein since that time
would have been impossible for most law reviews to manage.
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INTRODUCTION: SUDDEN DEVASTATION, TERRIBLE INJUSTICE

When Enron corporation filed for bankruptcy on December 2,
2001, it was the second titan of capitalism to crumble and collapse in
the latter part of that year. Less than three months earlier, on the
morning of September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorists had succeeded in
demolishing the twin office towers of the World Trade Center, killing
thousands of workers who had begun what they believed would be an
ordinary Tuesday.' As part of the same incident, the terrorists also
attacked and partially destroyed the Pentagon.2 The coincident, antiinstitutionalist nature of the attack made clear that this was not merely
an expression of mad rage. The terrorists had launched a direct attack

1.
This Essay is dedicated to the courage of John W. Perry and his family. John was
a New York University Law School classmate and friend, a member of the New York City
Police Force, and an active civil libertarian. He was killed while assisting the victims fleeing
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Having filed his retirement papers that
morning, John had no obligation to go to "Ground Zero," other than his own tremendous
commitments to duty, justice, and community. As attendance at his memorial service on
November 4, 2001, illustrated, John is and will continue to be missed by an extraordinarily
large, diverse community, and by me.
2.
On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorists working under Osama bin Laden's
direction hijacked four commercial aircraft departing from Boston and New York area
airports and crashed them into both Twin Towers and the Pentagon. Within two hours, each
of the office building towers, still partially filled with fleeing workers and rescuers who had
heroically entered to aid them, had collapsed from the heat generated by the burning of jet
fuel. The fourth hijacked flight, whose ultimate intended destination remains unknown,
crashed in a remote area of Pennsylvania. Its mission was aborted by a heroic passengers'
attack on the hijackers.
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on the American system? Their actions expressed not only disregard
for human life, but also disdain for the foundations of American
government, law, and our capitalist methods of production,
distribution, and exchange.4 As such, the attacks were only partially
successful; they failed to destroy their ultimate targets.
The scope of the destruction from the September 1lth attacks
stunned the country, bringing the work of government and commerce,
the normal ebb and flow of domestic life, and even classes at my law
school temporarily to a halt. For those whose families escaped
immediate physical harm, the number and randomness of the
casualties, the stories of survivors, and the New York Times "Portraits
in Grief" brought home the horror and sorrow caused by the attacks.!

3.
This Article evaluates the September I lth attacks as grotesquely violent,
abhorrent but ideologically driven protests against American-led, market-based globalization
and secularization. For a sweeping study of Middle Eastern and Islamic culture, providing
historic background to understanding September 11 th, see BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT
WRONG? VESTERN IMPACT AND MIDDLE EASTERN RESPONSE (2002). For critiques of
globalization and the reliability of assuming the coincidence of democratic governance and
market capitalism, see Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy,andEthmicity: Toward a New
ParadigmforLawandDevelopmen4 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998); Amy L. Chua, The Paradoxof
FreeMarket Democracy: RethinkingDevelopment Policy,41 HARv INT'L L.J. 287 (2000);
see also BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD vs. MCWORLD, How GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE
RESHAPING THE WORLD (1996). On globalization and free trade, more generally, see ULRICH
BECK, wHAT IS GLOBALIZATION? (Patrick Camiller trans., 2000); SASKIA SASSEN & K.
ANTHONY APPIAH, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998); GLOBAL CAPrrALISM (Will

Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 2001); and more popularly, Tina Rosenberg, TheFreeTrade
, N.Y. TIES, Aug. 18, 2002 (Magazine), at 28. For a defense from a free marketer, see,
for example, DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE (2002). After years of being

stalled on the matter, interestingly, in the final days of July 2002, the United States Senate and
House of Representatives endorsed the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, affording
President Bush so called "fast track" trade promotion authority. See The Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 107th Cong. (2002).
4.
Although I identify Al Qaeda's fundamentalism with antisecular, antimarket
ideology, neither Al Qaeda nor the Taliban are indifferent to or uninvolved in the
accumulation of material wealth.
For a discussion of the Taliban's and Islamic
fundamentalism's connection to the international oil business, see AHMED RAsHID, TALIBAN
(2000). For an analysis of Enron's questionable human rights practices in pursuit of market
hegemony and profit in the international oil business, see Steven R. Ratner, Corporatonsand
Human Rights:A Theory ofLegalResponsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). It is interesting
to conjecture the potential connection between Enron's management's noncompliance with
disclosure and accounting rules and its willingness to violate international human rights laws
and standards.
5.
William Weinert, my neighbor and a firefighter with Ladder Company 56 in the
Bronx, was one of the heroic persons undertaking rescue and clean-up efforts at Ground Zero
in the days immediately after September llth. Willie's and his wife's courage and
commitment in these awful days and weeks, and those of the other firefighters and rescue
workers who toiled there, demonstrate the "better angels" of the human spirit (as well as the
mistake ofconflating live individuals with economists' narrowly self-serving, rational actors).
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People all over the world struggled to understand and explain what had
occurred. What could have made the terrorists want to harm us, even
to destroy our government and centers of trade and commerce?
The attacks also inflicted widespread financialdevastation. Both
Wall Street and main street had been performing poorly in the period
prior to the attacks in comparison to the preceding years,6 but in the
aftermath of September 11th, discussions about recession shifted from
"if" to "how bad" and "for how long"?7 September 1lth increased
costs and reduced profits for both American corporations and,
interestingly, foreign ones as well.' Although New York City's major
On the latter, see Edward L. Rubin, PuttingRationalActorsin TheirPlace: Economics and
Phenomenology,51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1721-25 (1998).
6.
After the mild recession of the early 1990s, the second half of the decade saw
substantial increases in real property prices, strong business growth, robust consumer
spending, and an astonishing escalation in stock market prices-at the same time that
unemployment and inflation remained low. The NASDAQ composite index reached 5000, as
large amounts of wealth were created by a technology boom and the growth of the Internet.
Even in these good times, however, there were substantial increases in wealth and income
inequality,according to recent census figures.
7.
In November 2001, unemployment jumped to 5.4%, representing the highest
monthly jump in unemployment in twenty-one years. See United States Dep't of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Unemploymen4 available at
http://wwxv.bls.gov/bls/employment.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2002) (providing monthly data
series); see also Bureau of Economic Analysis, The TerroristAttacks of September 11th as
Reflectedin the NationlIncome andProductAccounts, SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. 81 (Nov.
2001), available at http://vww.bea.doc.gov/bea/an/attack.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2002).
According to most economists, the U.S. economy had entered recession by March 2001. The
standard definition of recession is two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth, but
there are also other more expansive and potentially more meaningful standards. According to
the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis's report of January 2002,
Real gross domestic product (GDP) decreased 1.3 percent in the third quarter of
2001 .... [T]he weakest showing for real GDP since a 2.0 percent decline in the
first quarter of 1991. The decrease followed four quarters of slow growth that
averaged only 1.2 percent, far below the 3.6 percent average growth rate over the
first 37 quarters of the 1990s expansion.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business Situaton: FinalEstimates for the Third Quarterof
2001, (Jan. 2002), available at http://wv.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2002/0lJanuary/
BSF0102.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2002). Small increases in GDP and consumer spending
were documented in the months after September 11th, but, as described in the text, a wave of
significant post-Enron accounting scandals has led to massive layoffs, wage stagnation,
decreases in consumer spending, widespread stock price declines, and economic instability
through the period up through this Article's publication.
8.
Shortly after September 1 lth, representatives of major U.S. airlines met with
President Bush and lobbied for federal financial assistance in order to forestall an industrywide failure. Heavy financial damage from September 11th was sustained throughout the
travel, tourism, entertainment, and insurance industries, both domestically and internationally.
Ironically, Houston suffered major financial damage from having both Continental Airlines
and Enron headquartered there. Increased shipping, security, and insurance costs spread
across economic sectors. In regard to the internatonaleconomic effects of September 11 th,
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downtown financial firms and struggling small businesses were
particularly hard hit,9 the financial damage was remarkably wide
ranging. Stock prices fell substantially when the capital markets
reopened for trading. There were substantial, widespread layoffs
within the United States,'" even as businesses, according to WallStreet
Joumal reports, wondered aloud whether laying off workers under
such conditions was "unpatriotic."
The focus of the federal government and federal fiscal policy
shifted dramatically in the weeks after September 1 th. As Congress
and the Bush administration prepared to respond militarily to the
terrorism, heighten domestic security, and provide economic assistance
to individuals and businesses that had been victimized," a significant
projected federal budget surplus slipped away. In the aftermath of
September 1lth, the financial collapse of Enron, and the monumental
see, for example, Joseph Kahn, WorldBank Says PoorNations Wll Suffer Worst Economic
Toll, N.Y. TwMEs, Oct. 2,2001, at B4.
9.
Lucette Lagnado, Down Town: Around GroudZero,An Effort to Rescue Momand-PopShops,WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,2002, at Al. New York City's economy showed signs of
weakening prior to September I1th, but it had remained stronger than the nation's as a whole.
This was reversed after the attacks. Leslie Eaton, Attack Gave a Devastating Shove to the
Cityl Teetering Economy,N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8,2002, at 35. By the summer of 2002 (fiscal
year 2003), the city faced a $4.76 billion budget shortfall. New York State Comptroller H.
Carl McCall estimated that each of the following two fiscal years would also see $5 billion
shortfalls in New York City's budget as a result of its lingering budgetary problems, the
aftereffects of September 11th, and the overall weakening of the national and city economy.
See H. Carl McCall, After the World Trade Center Attack, Fiscal Uncertainties Facing the
State and Local Governments (2001) (on file with author); William C. Thompson, Jr., One
Year Later: The Fiscal Impact of 9/11 on New York City (2002) (on file with author).
President Bush committed $21 billion in federal aid to New York City after September 11 th.
Private insurers have estimated that they would pay between $30 and $70 billion in claims
related to the attacks.
10. For data from the Mass Layoff Statistics program, see www.bls.gov; see also the
Bureau of the Census Web page at www.census.gov.
11.
Thomas M. Burton & Joseph T. Hallinan, Is It Unpatrioticto Lay Off Workers
When the Nation Facesa Csis91 WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2001, at Bi.
12. The shift in focus is dramatically evident in President Bush's State of the Union
Address of January 29, 2002. Moreover, after discussing the political and security-related
ramifications of September 1lth in detail, President Bush alluded to the threat posed by the
Enron scandal: "Through stricter accounting standards and tougher disclosure requirements,
corporate America must be made more accountable to employees and shareholders and held
to the highest standards of conduct' George W. Bush, State ofthe UnionAddress,available
atwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 1.html (Jan. 29, 2002). Through
the spring and summer of 2002, the President's discussions of the nation's "security" focused
increasingly on the need for law reform that might stabilize investor confidence and deter the
kind of corporate accounting fraud, executive self-dealing, and insider trading that suddenly
appeared shockingly widespread.
13. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
(2002), available at http://v3.access.gpo.gov/eopl/usbudgettfy2003/pdf/2002-erp.pdf (last
visited Aug. 17,2002).
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corporate failures that ensued shortly thereafter, neither the President,
Congress, nor the American people in general could
tolerate the risks
4
devices.
own
its
to
market
the
leaving
of
costs
and
Like that of the Twin Towers, Enron's collapse was sudden,
devastating, and horribly unjust in its effect." For 2000, the year prior
to its bankruptcy filing, Enron ranked as the seventh largest American
corporation based on the revenue criteria used by Fortune magazine.
As reported in its year 2000 Form 10-K, Enron's annual revenues
exceeded $100 billion.'6 Though we now know it did so erroneously,
in the same filing Enron reported netincome of $979 million for 2000,
$893 million for 1999, and $703 million for 1998." The tone of
Enron's Year 2000 Annual Report to shareholders (which was
submitted to the SEC and circulated to shareholders only nine months
prior to the company's bankruptcy filing) was triumphant, even smug."
An internal cover page declared "In Volatile Markets, Everything
14. SeeAppendix B: Market Data Illustrating the Effects of September 1 lth and the
Spring-Summer 2002 Financial Accounting Scandals. For commentary, see Floyd Norris,
Adding to Loss ofInvestments, A Loss ofFaith, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at Al. As the
New York Thnesreported:
In the nine weeks beginning a week before Memorial Day, the traditional start of
summer, the major United States stock market averages have lost more than 20
percent of their value, one of the fastest falls in Wall Street history. The decline has
come amid signs that some Americans are beginning to lose faith in the stock
market as a sure-fire long-term investment. Money is flowing out of mutual funds
at the fastest rate in years, faster even than last September, in the wake of the
terrorist attacks.
Id. For an historically significant argument that government should modulate the rate and
severity of the changes wrought by markets, see KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).

15. Prior to the fall 2001 debacle, Enron's directors, officers, and nearly all the sellside analysts covering the company had expressed ongoing confidence in its financial
prospects, despite the company's stock price decline. See Enron Form 10-K, filed Apr. 2,
2001, Item 5: Market for the Registantk Common Shares, availableathttp:/VwwN.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data (last visited Aug. 17, 2002).
16. See id. Item 6: SelectedFinancialData The post-bankruptcy filing coverage of
Enron's financial affairs exposed the bizarrely "inflating" revenue recognition treatment the
FASB had permitted for energy traders. See id This revelation, and the many other
extraordinary shortcomings in accounting and auditing procedures and standards that were
publicized in the spring and summer of 2002, led Congress to establish an "independent"
self-regulating oversight body to establish auditing standards and regulate accounting firms
that audit public companies. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, § 101, 107th
Cong. (2002).
17. It was discovered that in several cases Enron engaged in sham asset sale
transactions immediately prior to the end of a quarter, in order temporarily to alienate
depreciated properties that might otherwise have impaired the company's reported profits.
See Enron Form 10-K, supra note 15, Item 7: ManagementDiscussionandAnalysis.
18. ENRON, 2000ANNUALREPORT (2001).
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Changes But Us!"' 9 By the conclusion of 2001, however, neither
Enron's shareholders, employees, nor the American people in general
felt such winsome confidence.
By the spring and summer of 2002, concern about the
implications of Enron's sudden collapse had escalated into profound,
nearly pervasive anxiety about the veracity of corporate reporting and
the integrity of the corporate governance systems supporting it.2"
Markets that were already volatile and depressed became more volatile
and depressed. Commentators coined the terms "Enronitis" and "the
Cockroach theory"'" to make light of the very serious fact that
confidence in the accounting, auditing, disclosure, investment banking,
credit rating, and managerial oversight systems supporting the
"integrit '' of the capital markets had been grossly undermined by
19. Id. at 6.
20. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Worries of More Enronsto Come Give Stock
Pricesa Pounding,N.Y. TMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at C1; see Kenneth N. Gilpin, Range ofFears
PushesStocks to BigLosses,N.Y. TIEs,July 2, 2002, at Cl. The number of companies that
are being required to make financial restatements has risen astoundingly in the last several
years. According to the Huron Consulting Group, there were "270 restatements [in 2001], up
from 233 in 2000 and just 116 in 1997"' SeeJonathan D. Glater, RecomputingEarningswith
LawbookandEraser,N.Y. TIMES, July 2,2002, at C8. Figures for 2002 are not yet available.
As early as 1998, several prominent individuals, including Warren Buffett and Arthur Levitt
Jr., then Chairman of the SEC, had publicly denounced what they regarded as worrisomely
prevalent "earnings management"-a slippery slope to accounting fraud. SeeArthur Levitt Jr.,
The Numbers Game, Speech to the NYU Center for Law and Business, available at
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/newsarc/prl01 898.htm (Sept. 28, 1998). Nevertheless,
the stock market bubble had not yet burst, and prior to the Enron fiasco, neither lawmakers,
regulators, or corporate or financial firms themselves were persuaded to implement
substantial investor protective reforms.
21.
See Morgenson, supra note 20, at Cl; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Looking
Very Hard Before They Leap, N.Y. TIms, Feb. 7, 2002, at C7; Gretchen Morgenson,
Rebound from Ruin, If Not from Distrvs4 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at MB3; Patrick
McGeehan, Afer the "DarkestYear,"A Changed Wall Stree4 N.Y. T)MES, Sept. 8, 2002, at
MB3.
22. The staying power of the term "integrity" as applied to stock prices and the
functioning of the capital markets reflects, I believe, the unstated conviction that these
systems rely on the moral "integrity" of the persons overseeing firms and markets, and the
preciousness of our faith therein. A society's ability to sustain personal integrity, social
solidarity, and the capacity for trust among its members, through both social norms and law,
is a significant component of its ability to generate and sustain not only material wealth but
also broader measures of well-being, as discussed ihfi-a Indeed, this has always been the
foundational premise of corporate fiduciary law. See FRANcIs FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: Ti COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF COMiMUNiY (2000); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling
Alone: America . Declining Social Capital,6 J. DEMOcRAcY 65 (1995); Symposium, Trust
Relationships,81 B.U. L. REv. 329 (2001); Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a LawAbiding Society: Taing Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal
Authorities into Account When FormulatingSubstantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707
(2000). Corporate legal scholars have generally discussed the "integrity" of market prices in
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Enron's failure and the conduct of many of its principals and outside
counselors.23 In the following months, both the capital markets and the
relation to impersonal concepts of economic efficiency, or the relation of stock prices to the
"true" or "inherent" value of a corporation. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Stock PricesandSocial
Wealth, Harvard Discussion Paper No. 301, at 24-25, availableat http://wwxv.laxv/harvard.
edu/programs/olinscenter/papersf (last visited Aug. 28, 2002); Marcel Kahan, Securities
Laws and the SocialCosts of"Inaccurate"StockPrices"41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992). But there
is increased scholarly attention to the importance and conditions of trust and the role of law in
supportingit. See infianote 30 and accompanying text.
23. While faith in the honesty and transparency of corporate America has been hit
hard, confidence in the quality and value of the services performed by "public" auditors has
suffered nearly complete erosion. On June 15, 2002, a jury sitting in a federal district court in
Houston found Arthur Andersen, LLP, guilty of obstruction of justice for its destruction of
Enron documents subsequent to the SEC's commencement of an investigation into Enron.
David Duncan, Andersen's former lead audit partner for Enron's auditing work, had earlier
pled guilty to obstruction of justice. Such document destruction represents a flagrant
example of the kind of disrespect for the rule of law discussed herein.
Interestingly, neither Enron's inside general counsels nor outside lawyers have suffered
substantial public recrimination. The latter, Houston-based Vinson & Elkins, was active in
advising Enron on many of the transactions involving the special purpose entities that
ultimately fueled the destruction of the company. The absence of greater recrimination
against Enron's lawyers is suggestive of provocatively contrasting views of the role of a
company's auditors and its lawyers. See Enron May ForceReconsiderationofLauyerEthics
Rules, N.YL.J., Feb. 7, 2002, at 5. Although, when considered in isolation, the appropriate
moral course of conduct is plain enough, the proper professional role of an attorney faced
with a client's fraudulent financial conduct has been controversial for decades. Attorneys
defend the importance of their maintaining client confidentiality on the grounds that doing so
facilitates their ability to promote their clients' compliance with the law in the broader range
of cases. Nevertheless, more than three quarters of the states' professional conduct rules for
lawyers currently go beyond the official position of the American Bar Association in
affording lawyers substantial discretion (and in a minority of states requiring them) to
disclose a client's financial fraud in order to prevent or rectify a crime. SeeMODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2000). In the summer of 2001, the House of Delegates of the ABA
had rejected proposed changes recommended by the "Ethics 2000 Commission" (formally,
the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), which would have
permitted lawyers to make such disclosures.
Professors Tanina Rostain of New York Law School and Austin Sarat of Amherst
College have recently organized a Research Network under the aegis of the Law & Society
Association focusing on "Corporate Lawyers in Transnational Practice?' The group seeks to
encourage legal scholars' and social scientists' "empirical study of corporate lawyers and
their role(s) in creating and shaping international legal regimes and markets" in such areas as
the European Union, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia. Corporate lawyers' role
in facilitating compliance with the law and fostering norms of law abidingness has, of course,
become far more controversial amidst revelations of ongoing frauds at so many major
American companies and financial institutions. In addressing the August 2002 meeting of
the American Bar Association, SEC Chairman (and former corporate lawyer) Harvey Pitt
admonished the attendants that if corporate lawyers didn't do a better job of inspiring the
public's confidence in their professionalism and integrity, they would "face the fate of the
accounting profession?' Harvey Pitt, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the ABA$
Business Law Section, availableathttp:/wwv.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm (Aug. 12,
2002); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, SharingAccounting Burden: BusinessLaujiers
in Enron Dark Shadows, Boston College Working Paper (Apr. 2002), available at
http://papers2.ssm.com/paper.tafABSTRACTID=307978 (last visited Aug. 28, 2002)
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general economy teetered at the edge of crisis, as a wave of corporate
accounting scandals, executive sweetheart deals, and allegations of
insider trading broke over the financial landscape. Allegations of
wrongdoing have led to investigations and/or litigation at WorldCom
(which in July 2002 pushed Enron out of the number one slot as the
largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history), Qwest Communications,
Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco International, ImClone, Merck,
Xerox, AOL Time Warner, EDS, K-mart, Computer Associates
International, Rite-Aid, and Lucent, and also the investment banks
(Chase, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Smith Barney, inter alia)
and accounting firms (especially Arthur Anderson) that had served
their interests. Addressing the annual meeting of the American Bar
Association in August 2002, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt warned that
corporate lawyers had to work harder to avoid both actual and apparent
complicity in clients' frauds or they would otherwise substantially
forfeit their professional capital, as have public auditors to an
unfortunate degree.
Even strong proponents of the existing
governance and market arrangements were estopped from arguing (at
least convincingly) that Enron could be written off as an isolated case.24
Widespread support coalesced behind the need to reexamine sacred
cows of the American corporate, capital market system. Remarkably,
the President, Congress, the SEC, and many private sector bodies have
embraced this objective and commenced the project of achieving
significant legal, regulatory, and policy-based reforms.'
(arguing for greater accounting competency in business law practice and education, in light of
the fact that the distinct outlooks of the two professions have created a schism that "resolute
fraud artists" have exploited).
24. Enron's "exceptionality" or the "few bad apples" theory was still plausible in the
early spring of 2002, and a symposium at Columbia Law School held in April focused on
precisely this question. For an insightful analysis of the conceptual and practical governance
shortfalls exposed by Enron's failure, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Wat Enron Means for the
Managementand Controlofthe Modem Business Corporation:Some In'tlaRefetons,69
U. Cmi. L. REv. 1233 (2002).
25. On July 8, 2002, President Bush, speaking from Wall Street, delivered a major
address endorsing the need for heightened standards of corporate governance, transparency,
and integrity. For a transcript of the hearings, see TranscriptofPresident.AddressCalling
for New Era of Corporate Integrty, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2002, at C4. The President signed
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002), into law on July 30, 2002;
the Act has been widely hailed as the toughest federal antifraud, "corporate responsibility"
legislation since the Depression-era securities laws. In the face of what threatened to be the
worst bear market in a generation, Sarbanes-Oxley passed with overwhelming bipartisan
support. Lawmakers, and the President himself, sensed their political vulnerability in
appearing soft on business and white-collar crime in such a climate. The President also
established the Corporate Fraud Task Force to coordinate enforcement by the SEC and
federal criminal authorities, while the SEC considerably increased the number of
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But such reforms come too late to save Enron. Enron's
precipitous decline into bankruptcy in December 2001 resulted from
the sudden evisceration of multiple market participants' faith in the
accuracy of the company's reported earnings, revenues, and liabilities
figures, inter alia. Subsequent scrutiny revealed that Enron had been
the corporate equivalent of a "time bomb" waiting to go off. The
firm's implosion was triggered by revelations in the fall of 2001, at the
belated insistence of Arthur Andersen, Enron's auditor, of (1) material,
financial misstatements and omissions in past Enron public statements
and SEC filings, (2) the existence of liabilities and losses far greater
than previously had been publicly acknowledged," (3) sham hedging
and asset sale transactions, as well as (4) potentially unlawful executive
enforcement actions it was pursuing throughout the first half of 2002. On June 17, 2002,
SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt announced that the Commission had succeeded in implementing
all ten of the initiatives in President Bush's March 17, 2002 "Plan to Improve Corporate
Responsibility and Protect America's Shareholders." For a brief summary and commentary
thereon, see 17 CORP. COUNSELWKLY., June 26, 2002, at 193.
In regard to private sector initiatives, the Conference Board announced the creation of
the Blue Ribbon Panel on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, and the American Bar
Association established a Corporate Responsibility Task Force to review corporate
governance standards and lawyers' ethics rules. The New York Stock Exchange's Corporate
Accountability and Listing Standards Committee announced a series of reform proposals in
early June, as did the NASD. For the full text and a comparative analysis of the proposed
NYSE reforms, see www.nyse.com/press/press.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2002); for
commentary, see Holly J. Gregory & Jane G. Pollack, Raising Corporate Governance
Standards: A Reidew of the New NYSE & NASDAQ Listing Proposals,METRo. CORP.
CouNs., July 2002, at 29. The Business Roundtable, an organization of CEOs committed to
"policies that foster economic growth and a dynamic global economy,' had endorsed a set of
revised but comparatively conservative Principles of Corporate Governance in May 2002.
The organization was subsequently persuaded, however, in July, to support the more stringent
requirements and standards endorsed by President Bush and Congress. In August, the
Financial Services Forum, a group of CEOs of twenty one of the world's biggest financial
companies (including Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, AIG,Bank of New
York, Prudential, American Express, JP Morgan Chase & Co., and MetLife) announced that
their member institutions would, in the future, expense the cost of stock options on their
income statements-thereby propelling the norm of investor expectations and corporate
transparency standards further in this direction. On June 5, 2002, Henry M. Paulson Jr.,
Chief Executive of Goldman Sachs, made a speech at the National Press Club in Washington
declaring that American business faced "the greatest crisis" in his lifetime. See Patrick
McGeehan, An Unlikely ClarionCalls for Change,N.Y.TIMES, June 16, 2002, at MB 1.
26. On October 16, 2001, Enron reported a third-quarter loss of $618 million. John
Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, EnronJolt: Investments,Assets GenerateBzg Loss, VALL ST.
J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl. The next day Enron announced that it was reducing its shareholder
equity by $1.2 billion in order appropriately to reflect its transactions and relationship with
various off-balance sheet entities and financial partnerships. Rebecca Smith & John R.
Emshwiller, Partnershnh Spurs Enron Equity Cut WALL ST.J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl. On
November 8, 2001, Enron announced that it had overstated its profits in the previous five
years by $586 million. John R. Emshwiller et al., EnronRestates ProfitsSince 1997by20%,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,2001, atA3.
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self-dealing transactions involving scores of off-balance sheet, special
purpose entities.27

Further analysis has illuminated Enron's historic reliance on
dubious, and at times outrightly fraudulent, accounting and disclosure
practices, including the immediate recognition of profits on long-term
sales contracts of speculative, future value." In the fall of 2001, these
27. According to Vinson & Elkins's October 15, 2001, report to Enron's General
Counsel, LJM2 (a partnership run by Enron's former Chief Financial Officer, Andrew
Fastow), engaged in twenty-one transactions with Enron. Fastow earned an estimated $30
million from these transactions. The V & E report stated: "Within Enron, there appeared to
be an air of secrecy regarding the LJM partnerships and suspicion that those Enron
employees acting for LJM were receiving special or additional compensation." Report of
Vinson & Elkins, LLP, to James V Derrick, Jr., Enron Executive Vice President and General
Counsel, October 15, 2001, at 5, availableat2001 WL 1764266 [hereinafter V & E Report];
see e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Investors Lured to Enron Deals by Inside Daa N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2002, at Al. Enron's transactions with Southampton Place, L.P., in which several other
Enron senior executives and directors made millions of dollars, are also described in the
Powers Report. VILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. Er AL., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
CoxmM rE OF THE BOARD OF DmICrORs OF ENRON COR. (2002), available at 2002 WL
198018 [hereinafter PowRS REPORT].
The duty of loyalty-the most important concept in the states' laws governing
corporations-prohibits directors, officers, and other powerful corporate insiders from
profiting from financial dealings with their firm unless such fiduciaries (where challenged)
can demonstrate either that the transactions were "entirely fair" to the company or that the
transactions were ratified by fully informed disinterested directors or stockholders. SeeKahn
v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995); Kahn v. Lynch
Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). As applied by state courts in recent
years, the duty of loyalty's proscription of management secret profit taking has been
substantially diluted. For important commentary on the worrisome dilution of fiduciary
strictures in the corporate context, see, for example, Victor Brudney, ContractandFiduciary
Dutyin CorporateLaw, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595 (1997); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus
FiduciaryDuties, in PRnCnPALS AND AGENTs: THE STRUCTURE OF BusNESs (John W Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991); Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. RE. 795
(1983).
28. The precise shortfalls in Enron's accounting and disclosure practices are still
coming to light at the time of this Article's publication, but certain practices immediately
aroused grave concern vis-A-vis their propriety and even legality. For example, as suggested
in the text, Enron had permission from the Emerging Issues Task Force, operating under the
supervision of the FASB, to "mark to market" the value of its long-term contracts to deliver
electricity. Enron would forecast energy prices for up to ten years (a highly speculative
enterprise) and then record profits currently based on those internal models and favorable
assumptions. See Alex Berenson, Ex-Workers Say Units Earnings Were 'Illusory' N.Y
TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al; Floyd Norris & Kurt Eichenwald, Fuzzy Rules ofAccountiong
and Enron, N.Y. Tamis, Jan. 30, 2002, at C1. In addition, Enron engaged in a series of
financing arrangements in which J.P Morgan and an offshore partnership transferred capital
temporarily to Enron in deals that, while functionally analogous to loans, were reflected on
the company's balance sheets as assets and liabilities "from trading?' The New York Times
described the transactions, which were ongoing until the end of September 2001, as
effectively "disguis[ing] more than $350 million in new bank loans?' Kurt Eichenwald,
Enron id Big Loans, Data Indicate, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2002, at Cl. In regard to
disclosure, Enron's SEC filings described the existence of certain related party transactions
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revelations gave rise to fatal doubts about the company's actual
liquidity and profitability, as well as the quality and integrity of its
senior management."
Cascading uncertainty inflated the risk
associated with doing business with Enron for its investors and trading
partners to levels that were intolerably high, and finally, insupportable.
Because a substantial portion of Enron's business involved trading in
sophisticated energy and other derivatives, once there was doubt about
the company's ability to perform as a counterparty on such
transactions, this business, and the cash flow and profits it generated,
rapidly evaporated.
Never has there been a better illustration than the Enron story of
the importance of trust to the well-being of a business 3 -- both the
involving company senior executives, but in no way indicated the magnitude of the profits
realized by such insiders thereon-surely a material omission. Enron's SEC filings also
disclosed the existence of financial arrangements with certain trusts (for example, the Osprey
trusts) that might entitle the trusts to receive substantial additional Enron stock; but, again, the
filings failed adequately to portray the magnitude and significance of Enron's contingent,
equity-based obligations. See Enron Form 10-K, supranote 15. In addition, there is evidence
that Enron would sell deteriorated "merchanf' assets to the Fastow-related, special purpose
entities in the period immediately prior to the end of a quarter, and then repurchase them
shortly thereafter, at substantial gains to these entities, in order to inflate the company's
reported profits. See Kurt Eichenwald, Talk of Crime Gets Big Push, N.Y. TaIES, Feb. 4,
2002, at Al; POWRS REPORT, supranote 27. For a business savvy account of Enron's highrisk financial strategies, see Malcolm S. Salter et al., innovation Corrupted: The Rise and
Fall of Enron, Harvard Business School Working Paper 02-102 (2002), available at
http://vwwvw.hbs.edu/dor/abstracts/0102/02-102.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
29. On August 22, 2002, Michael J. Kopper, a former top finance executive at Enron,
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering, based on his
payment of large kickbacks to Andrew S. Fastow (Enron's former CFO). The kickbacks
came out of money Kopper received for managing partnerships that were used to hide
Enron's debt and increase its profits. See Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Enron Offcial Admits
Payments to FinanceChief,N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 22, 2002, atAl ("Mr. Kopper softly described
how he and his friend [Andrew Fastow] had worked assiduously over many years to use a
series of off-the-books partnerships to defraud Enron of millions of dollars'). The plea
agreement was considered a major step in the government's potential prosecution of Mr.
Fastow and other former Enron senior executives. See Kurt Eichenwald, A MethodBecomes
Clearerin a Methoacal nvestigaton, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 22,2002, at C l ("Some participants
in that deal [Southampton Partners]-including Ben E Glisan Jr., the company's former
treasurer-tried to reach deals with the government earlier this year, but investigators turned
them away because they were dissatisfied with what the deal participants were offering.").
Given Enron's financial contributions to lawmakers, and Kenneth Lay's close association with
President Bush, the Enron prosecutions are the focus of tremendous popular and political
interest.
30. For an important analysis of game theory's contribution to the subject, see
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).

As mentioned previously,

corporate legal scholars are giving increased attention to the importance of trust in
commercial transactions.
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness,andthe BehavioralFoundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U PA. L. REv. 1735
(2001); Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary
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importance of the trustworthiness of a corporation's leaders and the
dependability of the systems of accounting, auditing, and disclosure on
which trust in business and the capital markets rests. Enron's faulty
systems of accounting, auditing, and disclosure breached its investors'
and employees' rightful expectations of financial transparency.' In the
alternative, the opacity surrounding Enron's business affairs and
financial dealings was a true reflection of the firm's myopic, even
delusional, corruption-ridden culture.
On November 9, 2001, as mass sell-offs by spooked investors
depressed Enron's stock's price, Moody's lowered the company's credit
Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairnessand Trust in
CorporateLa; 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993).
31.
See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountabiliy: Retzhiing
CorporateFiduciaryLaw. Relevance to CorporateDisclosure,34 GA. L. REV. 505 (2000)
[hereinafter Kahn, Transparencji. "Transparency" is a term that has only recently come into
vogue in discussions of corporation law. This piece of the discussion, more conventionally,
had focused on the "when," "what" and "what-happens-if-not" of corporate disclosure, as
governed chiefly by the federal securities laws. I define "transparency" as an organization's
systematic commitment to facilitating the intrainstitutional flow of information and
promoting candor and comprehensiveness in its internal and public reporting of its financial
condition, operations, and performance of its stated objectives. With respect to corporations,
such transparency provides the basis of the norm of (both internal and external)
accountability, as well as a basis for operationalizing this norm by measuring corporate and
also managerial performance in conformity with profit driven, as well as more expansive, and
potentially more socially responsive, criteria. On the latter point, see Cynthia A. Williams,
The SecuritiesandExchange Commission andCorporateSocialTransparency,112 HARV. L.
REv. 1197 (1999 ); see alsoFaith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora:sBox: ManageialDiscretionand
the Problem of CorporatePhilanthropy,44 UCLA L. REv. 579, 625-36 (1997) [hereinafter
Kahn, Pandoram Box] (arguing that bona fide charitable giving by corporations can only be
legitimated through the democratizing effects of disclosure). In regard to the current limits
on required corporate "social transparency," as I have argued elsewhere:
[T]he limits of required corporate disclosure are more troubling for the fact that
Because the SEC's disclosure
they are implicit rather than express....
requirements do not articulate the normative principles which define them (that is,
the narrow and essentially economic interpretation of materiality and the limited
scope of the line-item disclosure requirements), we-as investors, commentators
and legislators-are less likely to "miss" what we do not see.
Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures,Courtsand the SEC"Reflecdons on Silence andPower
in CorporateandSecurties Law,41 N.YL. ScH. L. REv. 1107, 1141 (1997).
Transparency serves to enhance a body's responsiveness to scrutiny and reform, and
thus its adaptability and fitness. For discussion of disclosure as a corporate governance
therapeutic, see Louis Lowenstein, FinancialTransparencyand CorporateGovernance: You
Manage W1hat You Measure, 96 COLUtM. L. Rnv. 1335 (1996). Nevertheless, "transparency"
is an ideal, which, like the related concept of "democracy," cannot, need not (and indeed
sometimes should not) be attained in its absolute form in order to be meaningful. For a
critical examination of the mixed utility of the latter term, see Edward L. Rubin, GettingPast
Democracjy 149 U. PA. L. REy 711 (2001). The interrelationship of the practices and norms
of corporate "governance" and those of "democracy" is a theme that merits further, intensive
analysis.
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rating first to Baa3, its lowest investment grade, and then, on
November 28, to below investment grade. This downgrading of
Enron's credit rating triggered defaults under covenants in various
outstanding credit agreements;32 and the defaults, in turn, increased
Enron's equity obligations to investment vehicles affiliated with the
off-balance sheet partnerships that had begun to arouse such grave
concern. 3 Surrounded by the fallout from what began to look like
high-level corporate corruption, soon everyone just "wanted out. ' 4
When it was made, Enron's bankruptcy filing held the record for
being the largest in U.S. history. (Again, Enron was edged out of first
place in July 2002 when WorldCom's admissions of having
erroneously reported potentially in excess of $7 billion of revenue led
the company to file for bankruptcy law protection.)35 Enron
32. See Enron Form 10-Q, filed Nov. 19, 2001, available at http://vww.see.gov/
Archives/edgar/data (last visitedAug. 18, 2002).
33. The Osprey Trust issued $2.4 billion in privately placed notes to institutional
investors; the debt was backed by fifty million shares of Enron common stock. The full
details regarding the equity triggers on the Osprey Notes were first made public by Jeffrey
McMahon, Enron's then-CFO, on November 14,2001. SeeGretchen Morgenson, ManyMaj,
Be Surpiised to Be Enron Investors, N.Y TmEs, Jan. 25, 2002, at Cl. For an account of
Enron's potential abuse of special purpose entities by an expert in structured finance, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Some Thoughts on the Enron Bankruptcy, 71 U. CIN. L. RBv.
(forthcoming 2002).
34. The downgrading of Enron's debt, as well as the negative financial news first
publicized in Enron's third quarter Form 10-Q, filed on November 19, 2001, led Dynegy
Corporation to cancel a planned merger with Enron on Wednesday, November 28, 2001.
Enron filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in federal bankruptcy court in the Southern
District of New York the following Sunday morning. See Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B.
Henriques, Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted from Wthin, N.Y. TaiMs, Feb.
10, 2002, at Al.
35. WorldCom epitomized the boom and bust of the 1990's telecommunications
craze. The company then lost a fortune as the second largest long distance carrier in the
United States and Internet provider for up to a third of U.S. Internet traffic. Although its $40
billion debt load had imposed substantial cash flow pressure on the company (the assets of
which were valued in excess of $100 billion through spring 2002), WorldCom's downfall was
largely due to the revelation, in June 2002, that approximately $3.85 billion in operating
expenses (and later it was revealed $3.3 billion more) had not been disclosed, as well as the
fact that the company's profits were materially lower than had been reported. The company's
faulty accounting apparently involved the manipulation of reserves and the improper
capitalization of current expenses. After having reached a peak of $64.50 in 1999,
WorldCom's shares traded at 9 cents per share immediately prior to its Chapter I1 filing of
July 21, 2002. As the fraud came to light, WorldCom laid off in excess of 17,000 employees
(twenty percent of its workforce), and the SEC, Department of Justice, and Congress
undertook formal inquiries into its accounting and business affairs.
In addition, on August 1, 2002, WorldCom's former CFO, Scott Sullivan, and its former
controller, David F Myers, surrendered at the FBI's field offices and then, handcuffed,
appeared at the Federal District Court in lower Manhattan to face criminal fraud charges.
Referring to the charges in a public press conference, Attorney General John Ashcroft alerted
the public to the seriousness of the government's commitment to prosecuting corporate fraud,
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shareholders are estimated to have lost in excess of $60 billion in
market value in Enron stock. Tragically, thousands of Enron
employees had invested substantial portions of their retirement savings
in Enron stock through the company's 401(k) plan.
Six states'
pension funds each lost in excess of $100 million in value in Enron
stock; Florida's State Board of Administration alone lost $335
million.37 Upon the company's bankruptcy, 4000 Houston-based
employees, constituting approximately twenty percent of the firm's
workforce, were immediately laid off, many without severance." And
the local commercial and nonprofit economies in Houston, where

stating: "Corporate executives who cheat investors, steal savings and squander pensions will
meet the judgment they fear and the punishment they deserve." See Barnaby J. Feder & Seth
Schiesel, WfbrldCom Finds$3.3 Billion More in Irregularities,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at
A 1; Kurt Eichenwald, 2 Ex-Officials at WorldCom Are ChargedinHuge Fraud N.Y TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2002, at Al.
36. The concentration of Enron's employees' (and indeed any employees') retirement
savings in their employers' stock runs counter to the fundamental investment principle of
diversifying risk. Such excess concentration of employee funds in employer stock in 401(k)
plans appears common nevertheless. This may be attributable to (1) conscious employee
loyalty, (2) employer-imposed nonsaleability vis-A-vis company "matching" stock granted to
the employees, (3) overconfidence/cognitive bias on the employees' part resulting from their
immersion in their employers' corporate culture (as was clearly the case at Enron), and/or
(4) ignorance about the danger of being insufficiently diversified. Salutary 401(k) plan
reforms under consideration by Congress include requiring employers to give greater notice
of the benefits and opportunities for diversification and capping total employee 401(k)
investment in employers' stock. Reforms will be difficult to implement over the opposition
of employers, however, because American law does not require employers to contribute to
employees' retirement savings. There is, thus, a danger that "excessive" governmental
intervention will result in reducing total employer-sponsored benefits.
It is significant, also, that as employers have largely stopped providing defined benefit
retirement plans, the fiduciary obligations running from employers to employees vis-A-vis the
management of retirement savings, as provided under the Employee Retirement and Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), are less widely applicable. ERISA's fiduciary obligations are
generally inapplicable vis-A-vis company-sponsored 40 1(k) plans. For further discussion, see
Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congresss Misguided Decision to Leave
401(k) PlanParticipantsto TheirOwn Devices,CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POIfy 361 (2002).
37. See Leslie Wayne, The Enron Scandal Grazes Another Bush in Flodi4 N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at 32. In the summer of 2002, as state pension fund losses mounted
with the accumulating revelations of corporate financial accounting schemes, state officials
from New York, California, and North Carolina organized together to pressure Wall Street
firms to adopt policies limiting analysts' conflicts of interest. Their platform mirrored the
reforms agreed to between Merrill Lynch and New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as
part of the settlement of proceedings (which included Merrill Lynch's payment of a $100
million fine). See Patrick McGeehan, 3 State PensionFundsPut Pressureon Wall St., N.Y
TwMEs, July 2, 2002, at Cl. Provisions intended to reduce analysts' conflicts were also
enacted into federal law by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, § 201, 107th Cong.
(2002).
38. See Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Endedin a Dizzying Plunge,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al.
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Enron had been headquartered, experienced substantial financial
shortfalls as the company entered bankruptcy. 9
As Enron investors, employees (and other persons depending
upon them financially) have struggled to assess their economic losses,
they have also experienced serious psychological" and social
disruptions. Of course, major financial losses and/or the loss of a job
occasion substantial disruption of family and community life. And the
social and psychological tensions inevitably arising from such
financial losses are vastly magnified where there is a perception of
unfairness within the system, as opposed to the misfortune being
attributed to individual "fair" although adverse outcomes. Either
because these psychological and social costs are assumed, or perhaps
because they are impossible to quantify and commodify (and thus fall
outside of what is cognizable in a law and economics paradigm), they
have been underdocumented, underanalyzed, and generally
underappreciated by commentators and law reformers in assessing the
"costs" of corporate fraud and the law's appropriate response thereto."
Perhaps the most shocking aspect of the Enron story is that the
scope of the inequity at Enron-the apparent greed, dishonesty, and
callousness of the company's directors and officers-has so far (prior
to any remediation that legal action may produce) been matched by the
gross inequalityin the distribution of its effects. While employees and
investors incurred devastating financial losses in 2001, many seniorlevel insiders had already banked huge financial windfalls. Several
39. Polly Morrice, Editorial, Enroia Last Charity Ball,N.Y TIMES, Mar. 5,2002, at
A25 ("[T]he company's collapse left a dent of about $10 million in the 2002 budgets of local
nonprofit institutions?'). For scholarly perspectives on the connections between corporate,
commercial, and nonprofit economies, see Symposium, Corporate Philanthropy: Law
Culture,EducaYon, andPolifics,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv 753 (1997).
40. Social scientists are increasingly documenting the fact that people experience
their social status and sense of well-being in comparative, socially embedded terms.
Relatedly, they experience the loss of wealth and status-that is, downward mobility vis-A-vis
their peers, as a particularly grievous injury. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER:
WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY INAN ERA OF ExcEsS 104-06 (1999); RICHARD H. THALER,
THm WINNER's CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIc LIFE 106 (1991). This
research suggests a need for reexamining the practice and notion of using stock options to
align the financial incentives of (already affluent) corporate executives with the risk
preference and financial best interests of "ordinary" investors.
41. As a result of the widespread press coverage of the effects on investors and
employees of the losses arising from the kinds of massive corporate frauds uncovered at
Enron, WorldCom, etc., and the testimony presented to Congress in 2002, the tide may have
turned against legislative and judicial laissez faire. For further discussion, see infia Part VI;
especially notable is the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.
42. See Kurt Eichenwald, EnronPaidHugeBonusesin '01;Experts See aMotive for
Cheating, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 1,2002, at Al.
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Enron senior executives had exercised stock options and then sold
millions, even tens of millions of dollars of company stock in the
years, months, and even weeks prior to Enron's bankruptcy.43 Kenneth
Lay, Enron's long-time Chairman and CEO, was able to effectuate
lucrative sales of his Enron stock nearly continuously throughout 2001,
without publicly disclosing the sales during this period."
If, instead, Lay's stock sales had been made public in a timely
fashion, presumably they would have aroused greater scrutiny and
concern about what was occurring at Enron. And although such
concern would at least temporarily have depressed the price of the
company's stock, greater transparency might also have led to
management, operational, and reporting reforms that might have
resolved the problems at Enron before they proved terminal." In
addition, it is difficult to believe that corporate insiders at Enron (and
elsewhere) would have been compensated so lavishly-through stock
options, corporate "loans," and various other arrangements-if the true
expense of the perquisites had been reflected in the company's
financial statements and public reports.
43. See Leslie Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed In $1.1 Billion in
Shares, N.Y. Tamws, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al. On the basis of documents filed in court and with
the SEC, the New York Times calculated that top insider sellers included: (1) Lou Pai, the
former chairman of an Enron subsidiary, who received $353.7 million from his Enron stock
sales; (2) Kenneth Lay, who "trading almost daily," received $101.3 million from sales of his
shares; (3) Rebecca Mark-Jusbasche, a director and former Enron executive, received $79.5
million for her shares; (4) Ken Harrison, a director, received $75.2 million; (5) Jeffrey
Skilling, who served as CEO for seven months in 2001, received $66.9 million for his shares
(after December 2000, Skilling apparently sold stock at a pace of 10,000 shares every week);
and (6) Andrew Fastow, who received $30 million for his stock. Id.
44. Consistent with SEC Rule 16a-3(f), Kenneth Lay was permitted to delay the
reporting of $101 million of resales of his stock to Enron (effectuated throughout 2001) until
forty-five days after the end of the 2001 fiscal year. It cannot merely be fortuitous that the
complex insider loan/stock resale transactions that benefited Lay were deals that largely
evaded sunlight. This was part of their raison d'etre, as the savvy lawyer who structured the
arrangement knew well. (One of Sarbanes-Oxley's prohibitions is a ban on many of the types
of personal loans that companies had frequently extended to their directors and officers. H.R.
3763, § 402). In the alternative, the SEC's Rule 16a has generally required that corporate
insiders' standard market purchases and sales of their company's stock must be reported to
the SEC on Form 4 within ten days. Sarbanes-Oxley amends this deadline to the second day
after the execution of the transaction. Id. § 403.
45. This is one basis for my belief that managers' concealment of unfavorable
information, at least in the presence of a duty to disclose, is a violation of their fiduciary duty
of loyalty. Kahn, Transparency,supranote 31; see also RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (SECOND)
§ 173 (1959) ("Duty to Furnish Information: The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to
give him upon his request at reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the
nature and amount of the trust property."); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (SECOND) § 172 (1959)
("Duty to Keep and Render Accounts: The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to keep
and render clear and accurate accounts with respect to the administration of the trust?').
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Instead, in what appears in retrospect like a classic cover-up,"
throughout the late summer and early fall of 2001, Kenneth Lay
reassured Enron employees about the positive financial prospects of
the firm and even suggested that they would benefit from purchasing
more Enron stock." At the same time, Lay himself was selling off
much of his Enron stock and preparing to beseech President Bush's
cabinet advisors for help in saving the company.
At the board level, while Enron's directors were approving lavish
compensation packages for top-level executives over the years,49 and
46. This impression was heightened by Enron's and its auditors' destruction of
documents both immediately before and after the commencement of formal SEC inquiries
and investigations. Certainly, the conduct demonstrates a shocking irreverence towards the
rule of law. See Kurt Eichenwald & Floyd Norris, Enron Auditor Says It Destroyed
Documents,N.Y TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at Cl; Barnaby J. Feder & Michael Brick, EnronSays
Shredding ofRecords Was Not Stopped Untl Recently, N.Y. TuMEs, Jan. 30, 2002, at Al.
For Enron's efforts to mask its difficulties prior to October 2001, see Eichenwald &
Henriques, supm note 34, at Al. As stated previously, Arthur Andersen, LLP was convicted
on June 15, 2002 of obstruction ofjustice for destroying Enron-related documents.
47. Lay's dealings with his employees point to the shocking inadequacy of antifraud
protections on the part of corporate employees; as well as the complexity and ambiguity of
what it means for management to owe fiduciary obligations of candor to "the corporation and
the shareholders" in a situation where negative corporate developments are rapidly coming to
management's attention. This is true, especially, where the purpose of the corporation is
defined as "maximizing profits for the benefit of shareholders' For academic commentary
on the insufficiency of fraud protections for employees vis-A-vis their employers, see Kent
Greenfield, The UnjustfiedAbsence ofFedeml Fmud Protectionin the LaborMarket 107
YALE L.J. 715, 754-76 (1997). Several rounds of e-mails in which Lay reassured his
employees have come to light through press reports. According to the New York Tnes,on
September 26, 2001, Lay used an on-line chat room to encourage Enron employees to
purchase more shares. At the same time, he made no mention of a highly detailed, credible
letter that he had received from Sherron Watkins, an Enron vice president, warning of
significant accounting improprieties that might destroy the company if discovered. See
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Despite Warning, Enron ChiefUrged Buying ofShares, N.Y. TMIES,
Jan. 19, 2002, atAl.
48. The Bush Administration disclosed that at the end of October 2001, Kenneth Lay
had repeatedly telephoned Paul O'Neill, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Donald L. Evans,
Commerce Secretary, soliciting them for help in averting Enron's financial meltdown. Lay
had been highly apprehensive about the effect of a potential downgrading of Enron's credit
rating (which would trigger the equity-based credit enhancements described previously). In
fact, Enron's credit was indeed downgraded on November 9,2001, but Lay was unsuccessful
in persuading the Bush Administration to intervene to save Enron. See Richard W.
Stevenson, Enron Sought Aid of Treasury Dept. to Get Bank Loans, N.Y TMIES, Jan. 12,
2002, at Al.
49. See Enron, Schedule 14A, filed Mar. 27, 2001, Item 11: Compensation of
Directorsand Officers. Many legal and financial commentators are finally acknowledging
that the nearly universal adoption of lucrative executive stock option packages has provided a
chronic incentive to corporate short-term-ism, earnings management, and even fraud.
Although this perverse incentive has been a feature of the financial landscape for many years
(one that I addressed at a Cornell Law School faculty symposium in April 2000), it was
largely discounted as a serious threat to accurate reporting and the efficient operation of the

2002]

ENR ON AND TtE RULE OFLA W

1597

receiving lavish stock option packages themselves," they either failed
to inform themselves about the extraordinary, multimillion-dollar sums
several executives had made from their related party transactions with
Enron,51 or willfully elected to remain ignorant of them or chose to
ignore their significance." Although corporate legal commentators
have touted executive stock options' positive effects on management
and corporate performance, the substantial stock option grants paid to
Enron's directors (counter to the prevailing wisdom) failed to induce
them to perform the kind of diligent, honest service that would
genuinely have benefited the company and its shareholders. Instead,
the options appear to have contributed to a gross overconcentration on
near-term profit maximization at any cost.
As if to add insult to injury, two days prior to the company's
bankruptcy filing, while "rank and file" employees were being laid off
with little or no notice or severance pay, many senior-level executives
received lucrative retention bonuses (totaling more than $55 million in
value) to remain with the firm even if only through the initalphasesof
its bankruptcy proceedings!53 When the financial fortunes of these
senior-level employees are compared to those of the workers-who in
stock market and broader economy until the bubble burst and the economy entered recession
in mid-2001.
50. For data on Enron's executives' and directors' stock option and cash
compensation, see Enron Schedule 14A, supra note 49. In late June 2002, while ImClone's
chief executive was being investigated for insider trading, the New York Times published a
roster of infamous corporate insiders who had made millions of dollars on their sales of
company stock notwithstanding major declines in their firms' stock prices. See Timing Is
Everything, N.Y. TImES, June 30, 2002, at 14; Stephen Labaton & David Leonhardt,
WispersInside. ThunderOutside., N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 2002, at MBI.
51. The Powers Report indicates that the board was woefully ignorant on this matter.
PoWERS REPORT, supra note 27. But a Senate Committee report concluded that the board
knew or had the opportunity to know the material facts about insiders' overreaching and other
improper conduct. Permanent Subcomm. on Inveszations of the Sen. Comm. on
GovernmentalAffars: The Role of the BoardofDirectorsin Enron. Collapse,S. RE. No.
107-70, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter GovernmentalAffairs InvestigatibnsSubcommittee
Report].
52. For description of such transactions, see PowEns REPORT, supranote 27; see also
Kurt Eichenwald, Dealat Enron Gave InsidersFastFortunes,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at Al.
53. At a hearing conducted by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on
February 5, 2002, Enron benefits managers testified that the company had paid $55 million
in retention bonuses to select managers twvo days before its bankruptcy filing. At the same
time, the company announced that it could not provide severance to 4500 workers who had
been laid off On August 28, 2002, a federal bankruptcy judge involved in the Enron
proceedings approved a settlement package affording laid-off employees $28.8 million in
additional severance pay and the right to attempt to recover the (then estimated to be) $80
million in executive retention bonuses the company paid out in exchange for abandoning
other claims against Enron. Eduardo Porter & Mitchell Pacelle, Judge IncreasesSeverance
Pay To FormerEnronEmployees,WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at A3.
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many cases had their retirement savings wiped out-the tragedy and
inequity is plain enough. It is highly doubtful, moreover, that litigation
will even substantallylevelthe playing field ex post.' As discussed in
Part I, legal developments in the 1990s have imposed significant
hurdles to plaintiffs' recoveries in securities class actions, even in
meritorious cases.
For the reasons described above, the suffering experienced by
those who lost significant savings and/or jobs on account of Enron's
failure has been deepened by a sense of betrayal. These individuals'
losses cannot be construed, as had initially been suggested by Paul
O'Neill, the Secretary of the Treasury, as "part of the genius of
capitalism." Neither Enron's investors nor its employees had made
the mistake of investing in buggy whips at the advent of the motor car
era. Rather, on account of Enron's directors' and officers' either
intentional or reckless publication of erroneous financial data and
other misleading disclosures, neither the company's employees nor its
investors had had the information they would have required to make
rational decisions about their investment of human and financial
54. Commentators have long recognized the shortfalls in securities class action
plaintiffs' recoveries. For citation to relevant empirical surveys and significant commentary,
see James D. Cox, Making Secwiies Fraud ClassActions Virtuous, 39 AIZ. L. REv. 497
(1997). In a rare, "plaintiff-friendly" move, Congress in Sarbanes-Oxley extended the statute
of limitations in private securities fraud actions, but the change applies only to those actions
commenced after its enactment. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, § 804, 107th Cong.
(2002). A further problem facing Enron plaintiffs, as discussed hifi-, is that holdersof Enron
equity, who purchased their securities prior to the publication of the fraudulent statements and
held them until after the alleged frauds were exposed (by which time the stock had lost almost
all of its market value) lack standing to bring a private cause of action under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). This
group would include many pension funds and employee 401(k) accounts, of course. In
addition, the state law, fiduciary cause of action for equity holderswho are defrauded by their
directors or officers is presently of uncertain status. See infia note 128 and accompanying
text.
55. On January 13, 2002, on the television program Fox News Sunday, in first
publicly reacting to the news of Enron's bankruptcy filing, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill
described Enron's situation as reflecting the "genius of capitalism." O'Neill went on
succinctly to state the essence of the free market, egalitarian, meritocratic ideology underlying
U.S. capital market participation: "Companies come and go. Part of the genius of capitalism
is that people get to make good decisions or bad decisions. And they get to pay the
consequences or to enjoy the fruits of their decisions. That's the way the system works' Of
course, this ideology and market mechanism is subverted, rendered dysfunctional when
corporations publish false information. Investors deprived of accurate corporate information,
by definition, are deprived of the opportunity to make and live by their own "good or bad"
decisions. As allegations, investigations, and revelations of fraud at major American corporations erupted throughout the summer of 2002, O'Neill adopted a far less flippant view of the
appropriate legal and governmental response to insiders' abuse of the financial reporting
system.
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capital in the firm. This absence of transparency meant that when
Enron failed, neither its investors nor its employees could blame their
own (mis)judgments or their own bad, "dumb" luck." They had
unknowingly been deprived of the information they would have
required to have authorship over their choices. Instead, they had
become victims of fraud and self-seeking conduct of startling
dimensions.

II.

FANATICISM, IDEOLOGY, AND THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN
CAPITAL MARKETS

There are many intriguing insights to be drawn from the nearly
chronologically coincident events of Enron's financial collapse and Al
Qaeda's fatal attack on the Twin Towers. Perhaps most fundamentally,
both catastrophes can be conceived of as the product of unchecked,
antidemocratic fanaticism. Al Qaeda's ideology, to the extent that it
can rationally be construed, is radically anti-American, antimarket
capitalist, anti-individualist, and antisecular. In the alternative, Enron's
executives' ideology-as illustrated by their conduct and
institutionalized in the company's vision and values statement, its
public and internal documents, and corporate paraphernalia, was
super-aggressively (if opportunistically or "pseudo") pro-market
capitalist, radically individualist, antigovernment (even quasianarchistic), and messianic only in its commitment to the pursuit of
corporate power and of immediate profit. Importantly, and ironically,
both forms of fanaticism reflect a deep hostility to the norms and
values embodied in the notion of the secular "rule of law"
The terrorists launched a violent attack on American government
from outposts in distant lands. In contrast, Enron sought to quell the
force of democratic government from within, either by molding the
law to its advantage, through massive lobbying and campaign finance
expenditures, or by evading its dictates, if necessary, through strategic
maneuvers that included accounting fraud. And there is increasing
evidence, moreover, that although Enron was publicly espousing the
56. Enron's filings and reports were notoriously nontransparent. However, the
positive hype generated by financial analysts may have prevented many investors from
gaining a clear appreciation of the significance of what they didn't see. For the discussion of
analysts' potential conflicts of interest, see inf-a notes 93-96 and accompanying text. As they
vould seem less affected by the financial conflicts facing sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts'
failure to steer clear of Enron is more difficult to understand. For hypotheses, see Paul M.
Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Role of Capital Market Intermediaries in the Demise of
Enron (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presented at Harvard Law
School, May 2002).
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benefits of free markets, it was using its own economic and political
power during the California power crisis, if not elsewhere, to subvert
the normal operation of energy and other commodities markets. In
addition, the company's role in influencing Vice President Dick
Cheney's Energy Task Force in its formulation of federal energy policy
(to the company's private advantage and the detriment, potentially, of
consumers, inter alia) is a matter of ongoing controversy. In judging
Enron's corporate successes, it still remains unclear whether the
company evolved truly novel, social wealth-enhancing solutions to
problems of corporate organization and supply and demand," or
alternatively, in large part, exploited a stock market bubble and the lack
of transparency attendant to "newish' highly complex forms of
financing to cheat well, look good, and get lucky-for a while.
In any event, Enron's financial collapse has brought attention to
its and other firms' unabashed ongoing application of large sums of
money to effect favorable political and legal outcomes-outcomes that
might or might not be favorable, over the longer term, to investors,
employees, or consumers, but were calculated to be favorable, almost
surely, to the corporate power brokers themselves. The public outcry
and feared political backlash from the specter of Enron (and big
business and Wall Street more generally) "getting over on" the law and
lawmakers was so great that Congress was moved, finally, after years
of stonewalling, to enact meaningful campaign finance reform." In
this silent subversion of the proper operation and legal dictates of truly
representative, democratic government, Enron posed a threat to the
nation's security and core values that was no less real than that posed
by Al Qaeda.
For example, Enron's failure illustrates the precariousness of
traditional distinctions of "private" and "public," as applied to law,
social institutions (including business organizations), values, harms,
costs, etc.-distinctions that feminist legal theorists and even
progressive corporate legal scholars have long queried. But perhaps
the most compelling lesson emerging from Enron's fall is that the
absence of fair play and "due process" in regard to the governance of
corporate firms-which would mandate, for example, strict laws
fostering the accurate presentation and equal availability of corporate
financial information, limiting the financial conflicts of interest that
57. For a thoughtful analysis of the credibility of this proposition, see William
B ratton, Enron andthe Dark Side ofShareholderValue, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
58. Bipartisan Campaign Finance ReformAct of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81

(2002).
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may pertain to a corporation's analysts, advisers, and principals, and
corporate underwriting of the political process, not only (re)distributes
losses and gains unfairly (by definition), but also produces profound,
widespreaddisaffection, resentment, and even increased lawlessness."
As sociologist David Sciulli has argued persuasively, the presence or
absence of republican, democratic procedural norms in corporate
governance reverberates throughout broader social structures and
intermediate institutions in civil society.' Social solidarity and the
capacity to trust and cooperate, in turn, are essential resources for
increasing wealth. At a higher level of organizational behavior, the fill
costs of "exit" become impossible to appraise, "voice" becomes a
saving strategy.
In addition to the investors and employees immediately affected,
even "bystanders" to the Enron story have felt outrage at the
realization that "insider" corporate and capital market participants
successfully leveraged their positional advantages (vis-A-vis
information and decisional authority) to make millions of dollars of
profits, while the Enron corporation, its outside investors, and its
ordinary employees suffered catastrophic losses." Insider overreaching
and institutionally entrenched inequality cut deeply against the core
values and beliefs that have animated the paradigmatic "American
dream." These values and beliefs, this ideology, has fostered the social
solidarity necessary to support corporate and capital market
institutions in hardscrabble as well as happier times. Although it has
been less keenly observed, ideology has always been a feature of
American economic, as well as political life.
As political scientists and sociologists have observed, despite the
absence of consensus in the United States regarding the substantive
components of "the good life," there is widespread consensus that
59.

Perceived opportunism on another party's part invites, indeed, warrants defection.

SeAXELROD, supra note 30, at 6-11, 111; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE

OBEY THE

LAw 71-84 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of the Corporate Actor: Legitimacy,
Procedural Justice and Compliance with Corporate Rules and Policies, Feb. 2001
(unpublished paper, on file with the author).
60. DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POXVER INCIVIL SOCIMr (2001).
61. See Rick Bragg, Workers FeelPainofLayoffs andAddedSting ofBetraya, N.Y.
TMEs, Jan. 20, 2002, at 1. This outrage was also articulated in testimony in congressional
hearings by Enron executives who had complained to their superiors about the company's fast
and loose accounting and disclosure practices and insiders' self-dealing transactions, to no
avail. See Text of Letter to Enron. ChairmanAfter Departureof ChiefExecutive, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 16, 2002, at C6 [hereinafter Watkins'Lettel]. Sherron Watkins' letter was
released to the public by the House Energy and Commerce Committee on January 14, 2002,
and Watkins herself testified before Congress, verifying the complaints and concerns she
articulated in her letter.
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social structures, governmental processes, and the legal system must
respect and foster the equal dignity of persons.' This central tenet of
political liberalism is the dominant public philosophy of the modem
American era, the conceptual core of the country's legal and political
systems.6' And in addition to operating in the political and legal
spheres, these values have inhabited the concept of "free markets," and
have operated as a crucial ingredient in making American capital
markets and corporate and financial institutions effective and durable,
and thus successful.
In specific form, such values are manifest in the federal and state
prohibition on insider trading, in the SEC's recently enacted
Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure),' and, perhaps, in the SEC's Rule
14D-10 (the "all holders/best price" rule), inter alia" But they also
operate, more comprehensively, in the basic architecture of corporate
governance:
the triad of (1) shareholder voting, (2) managerial
fiduciary obligation (which rests in turn on the fundamentally political
notion of shared and delegated authority), and (3) mandatory, periodic
reporting (as prescribed by federal securities and state fiduciary law).
In this regard, the question of whether particular corporate and
capital market rules are narrowly profit maximizing or whether
individual profit motivated investors would agree to them ex ante
misses a crucial piece of the socio-economic puzzle. The commitment
to personal "liberty" that is integral to the concept of free markets as
constructed under U.S. law requires more than the absence of
governmental coercion. In this positive form, this liberty interest
motivates and necessitates rules that seek to ensure that trading in
capital markets, and thus the redistribution of profits and losses
resulting therefrom, will occur in an environment in which accurate,
intelligible, comprehensive corporate financial data is widely and
equally made available to those who seek it. In this regard, corporate
misrepresentation and insider secret profit taking are antithetical to the
62.
JUSTICE (2d

63.

For valuable commentary, see MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LM11s
ed. 1999); WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMVORARY POLMCAL PHLOSOPHY (1990).

OF

MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DIsCoNTENT (1996).

64. 17 C.ER. Part 243 (2002); see, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
Exchange Act Release No. 7881, 73 SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15,2000).
65. In Rule 14d-10 (the "all holders/best price" rule), the SEC required that tender
offers must be made to all holders of equity securities of the class subject to the tender offer,
and that the offeror must offer the same price and type of consideration to all offerees, with
limited exceptions. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules All-Holders and Best-Price
Exchange Act Release No. 6653, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,016, at 88,190 (July 11, 1986).
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egalitarian, democratic, ideological underpinnings of American
corporate and capital market institutions.
Though harder to model in scientifically rigorous terms, ideology
is as crucial to solid institutional design as is efficiency. Investor
confidence is a function not only of historic objective financial criteria,
but also, ultimately, moral, cultural, and ideological expectations. And
for these expectations to remain robust and efficacious, they must be
backed by law to a significant degree. The way that accurate
information was distributed asymmetrically at Enron, that is to certain
inside investors and certain upper-level employees,' 6 conflicted with
fundamental liberal values and notions of personal freedom that rightly
inhere in the concept and operation of free markets. The outrage that
many Americans experienced in learning about the fraud and unfair
dealing at Enron and WorldCom, and the other companies where
frauds of various kinds have recently been alleged, has been
compounded, made searing, by the simultaneously broadcast image of
"ordinary" Americans risking, potentially sacrificing, their lives to
defend freedom and equality against foreign terrorism. The crisis in
investor confidence that clouded the summer of 2002 reflected
Americans' decreased faith that liberal, democratic values have been
reinforced by law in the existing systems of domestic corporate
governance and capital market regulation. As analysts chart the effect
of such increased investor skepticism on stock market prices, it has
increasingly become evident in assessing the harms arising from
corporate fraud, that "private," economic, allocative concerns and
"public," ideological, and distributional ones synchronize and become
inextricable.

III.

ENRON AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE FAILuRE OF CHECKS
AND BALANCES

By early spring 2002, more than a dozen official inquiries into
the conduct of Enron's directors and officers and the auditors, lawyers,
investment bankers, and analysts who profited from transacting with
them were ongoing.67 A disturbing, nearly pervasive mistrust of
66. When Enron sold partnership interests in "LJM2" it provided the offerees a
chance to profit from confidential information about Enron's investment plans; thus, LJM2's
investors had more accurate information about Enron's financial situation than Enron's
ordinary employees and public shareholders. See, e.g., Eichenwald, supra note 27, at Al;
Diana B. Henriques & Kurt Eichenwald, A Fog Over Enron,and the LegalLandscape, N.Y.
TiMEs, Jan. 27, 2002, at MB1.
67. For citation to the congressional hearings and governmental investigations, see
Appendix A, hu5"i The operation of professional credit rating agencies has also come under
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corporate America and Wall Street hung in the air. Members of
Congress heard testimony regarding the highly aggressive, at times
unlawful, methods by which Enron inflated its revenue"8 and profit
figures 9 and masked its total liabilities." And before the Enron
hearings had even concluded, Congress initiated hearings into the even
more massive accounting fraud that had been exposed at WorldCom.
It soon became apparent that the multiple corporate governance checks
and balances intended to safeguard the integrity of management
oversight, corporate reporting, and accounting and auditing
practices-and thus, the accuracy of pricing in the capital markets as a
general matter, had broken down in the case of Enron, WorldCom, and
indeed several other major, seemingly successful American
corporations.7' In Enron's case, this breakdown extended to the board's
failed oversight of senior management and internal control systems,
Arthur Anderson's failed auditing, and outside financial analysts'
failure to recognize that much of what Enron was producing was
merely hype.

scrutiny. For commentary, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Pivate OrderingofPublicMarkets: The
RatingAgencyParadox,2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1.
68. Under current regulations, energy traders can record as revenues the total value of
contracts traded, rather than merely their receipts (or losses) on trades. Enron should have
made a corresponding entry for the costs of the contracts, however. According to a New York"
Times report, if Enron had been required to record revenues in a conventional manner
analogous to a brokerage firm, its year 2000 revenues would have been $6.3 billion, instead
of in excess of $100 billion. See Gretchen Morgenson, How287TumedInto 7- Lessonsin
FuzzyMath,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20,2002, at MBI.
69. SeeBerenson, supra note 28, at Al. The New York Tnesreported:
As soon as [Enron Energy Services] signed a contract, it estimated what its
profits would be over the entire term, based on assumptions about future energy
prices, energy use and even the speed at which different states would deregulate
their electric markets.
Then Energy Services would immediately pay its sales representatives cash
bonuses on those projections and report the results to investors as profits. By
making its assumptions more optimistic, the division could report higher profits.
Id
70. Prior to the restatements of fall 2001, Enron had failed to aggregate liabilities in
certain off-balance sheet entities with those of the larger company. In addition, Enron
engaged in transactions that functionally were loans but were accounted for as "swaps." See
Eichenwald, supranote28, at Cl. These "swap" transactions "allowed something that had all
the earmarks of a bank loan to be written up instead as cash assets and liabilities from the
company's trading business?' Id
71. Such egregious, multiple, coincident systems failures would previously have been
considered virtually impossible. This explosion of perceived security and order, with the
inevitable consequence of profound, lingering ongoing popular anxiety and economic
destabilization, is another parallel between the effects of Enron's collapse and Al Qaeda's
successful assault.
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Clearly, an important factor in these disasters was that there were
too many kinds of financial conflicts of interest affecting too many of
the participants. Greed, the rule of mammon, had overtaken the rule of
law72 Massive stock option grants to Enron's executives, as well as its
outside, theoretically "independent" directors 3 gave them too strong a
72. I am currently working on a broader analysis of the concept of the "rule of law"
and its application to corporate governance and corporate and securities law. The concept,
interestingly, has rarely been invoked or analyzed in relation to corporate governance. For a
basic but sweeping consideration of the concept of the "rule of law," see ANDRExv ALTMAN,
ARGUING ABOUT LAW (1997); GEORGE R FLETCHER, THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL
THOUGHT (1996) (analyzing the continued intellectual and cultural force of the rule of law
concept and its influence on law reform); ANTHONY J. SEBoK, LEGAL POsrrIVISM IN
AtMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998) (assessing legal process concerns and the rule of law
concept in relation to the formalism/positivism dialectic); LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY
SHERWiN, THE RULE OF RULES (2001) (analyzing the relationship of rules to the concept,
authority and binding force of law); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999) (arguing that dedication to the rule of law
concept structures other crucial cultural beliefs and values that have too frequently been
missed by legal scholars in their pursuit of particular law reforms). In relation to democratic
theory, political economy, financial governance, and the other lines of inquiry pursued herein,
see also JURGEN HABERMAS, BETVEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRBUTONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAxv AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996) (providing a sociologically
informed analysis of the values and practices underlying democratic organization and their
relationship to law and basic rights); HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAv (MARXIST
INTRODUCTIONS) (1995) (applying the insights of Marxist social theory to a critique of the
concept of the rule of law); THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM INRUSSIA (Jeffrey D.
Sachs & Katharina Pistor eds., 1997) (applying an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing the
influence of Russia's distinctive traditions of law "and lawlessness" to the evolution of the
economic system and economic regulation in that country); DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW
AND ISLAM (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999); THE RULE OF LAW INTHE
MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD (Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000).
73. Companies are required to disclosure the total number of options granted to their
employees and directors in their Annual Reports and Proxy statements, pursuant to SEC
Regulation S-K, Item 402. However, they are not currently required to "expense" them, i.e.,
to deduct the value of the stock options granted from the company's annual earnings figures.
This appears more anomalous because of the fact that companies are permitted to deduct the
value of stock option grants as a compensation expense for federal income tax purposes.
In April 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had moved to require
companies to deduct the value of the stock options granted from their reported earnings
figures. See FASB, Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Standards: Accounting for
Stock-Based Compensation (Financial Accounting SeriesNo. 127-6, 1993). Opposition from
executives and the accounting industry was enormous, and the FASB dropped the proposal.
See FASB Abandons Bid to RequireExpersingofEmployee Stock Options,26 Sec. Reg. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1725 (Dec. 23, 1994). More recently, the International Accounting Standards
Board moved to adopt rules that would require the cost of stock-based compensation to be
reflected in income statements. It received "harshly worded" warnings of a tough battle if it
pursued the initiative. See Steve Burkholder, Battle Signaled over L4SB Moves Toward
Expensing ofStock Options,33 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 1520 (Oct. 22, 2001).
In the summer of 2002, members of Congress increasingly objected to the excessively
executive-friendly "double standard" in the accounting versus tax treatment of option grants.
See Greg Hitt & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Perk Police: Stock Optons Come UnderFire in
Wfa-e of Enronk Collapse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at Al; see also David Leonhardt,
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motive to authorize overly aggressive accounting treatments, and to
maintain their silence, ' and thus, the company's high-flying stock price
when trouble surfaced. According to the Now York Times, Enron's
directors received approximately $400,000 annually for their board
service, approximately eighty-five percent of this compensation was in

Pressurefor OverhaulBuildson Stock Options,N.Y TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at CS. On July
11, 2002, Senator John McCain attempted to include a provision that would require the
expensing of stock options on corporate income statements in reform legislation coming
before the Senate, but his initiative was killed in a series of procedural maneuvers. Text of
ProposedAmendments, 148 CONG. REC. S6676 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) ("Mr. McCain
submitted an amendment intended to be proposed ... S. 2673 ... 'Stock Options Must Be
Booked As Expense When Granted."). The full text of the proposed amendment is available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:l. Senator Carl Levin has also taken up the
cause. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senator Urges ChangeinHowStock OpdonsAreHandled
N.Y TIMES, July 13, 2002, at Cl. On July 14, 2002, the Coca-Cola Company became the
first firm of its size to announce that it would voluntarily account for the value of stock
options granted to executives and other employees as an expense. See Floyd Norris & Sherri
Day, Coke to ReportStock OpionsAs an Expense,N.Y TIMES, July 15, 2002, at A l. Within
days the Washington Post Company (with Warren Buffett as its largest outside shareholder)
followed suit-raising the possibility that the norm would shift to voluntary expensing of
options.
74. Under current corporate governance standards, corporate directors have legal
authority to set their own compensation amounts. As Jeffrey Gordon has observed, directors'
compensation poses a major problem, even structured in "incentive," i.e., stock-based form.
Paying too little risks underincentivizing directors to act diligently vis-A-vis firm governance;
while paying them too much, especially in stock, creates too great an incentive for them to
disregard or even squelch unfavorable news in order to support high stock prices. See
Gordon, supranote 24, at 1242-45. Most academic commentators have lauded the granting
of substantial stock options to corporate directors on the notion that they will serve as an
inducement to their better management of the firm and thus stronger corporate performance.
See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF CORP. DIPS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLuE RIBBON COMMISSION ON
DIRECTOR COMPENSATION 15 (1995) (recommending that stock option compensation make
up the largest component of director remuneration); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care,
Compensation, and Stock Ownership,63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 652-53, 700 (1995) (same).
But a causal link between higher stock-based management compensation and improved
corporate performance has not emerged clearly in empirical studies, and the practice remains
controversial in relation to pay equity. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate
Executive Compensation Through a PartnershipLens: A Tool to Refocus Reform, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 153 (2000); Floyd Norris, Stock OptionsAreFaultedbyBuffet4 N.Y TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2002, at B1.
For an early legal treatment of the challenge to candor posed by financial statement
driven incentive-based compensation, see Kamin v American Express, 383 N.YS.2d 807
(Sup. Ct. 1976), affdon opinion below, 387 N.YS.2d 993 (lstDept. 1976) (holding that the
board's decision to eschew an $8 million tax savings in order to bolster the firm's reported
earnings numbers was to be judged under the deferential business judgment rule). As a way
of addressing this conflict between "cashing in" and facilitating truthful reporting, in the
summer of 2002, members of Congress evaluated the political and legal viability of requiring
executives to hold the company stock they receive through option exercises throughout, or
through a substantial period of, their tenure in office. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Slivers of
Supportfor Shackling CorporatePay,N.Y TIMES, July 13, 2002, at C1.
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the form of stock options (valued at the date of the annual meeting). 5
In many, if not most cases, Enron's "outside" directors' objectivity was
compromised also by corporate "charitable" contributions to
organizations that the directors were affiliated with, as well as other
remuneration unrelated to their board service.' Indeed, the full extent
of Enron's contributions to nonprofit organizations affiliated with its
directors cannot be ascertained because corporations are not required
by any federal or state laws to disclose the size or recipients of their
"charitable" donations.
Under the American model of corporate governance, consistent
with state statutory law and fiduciary obligations of care, the board of
directors has primary legal responsibility for decision making on
nonroutine corporate affairs and primary oversight responsibility for
ensuring the integrity of the firm's essential internal controls. Most
crucially, this oversight responsibility requires boards to ensure the
quality and integrity of senior management by appointing, and if
appropriate, dismissing the corporation's senior executive officers.
The board also has primary legal authority over and responsibility for
overseeing the implementation and overall efficacy of the firm's
information-gathering and reporting systems, as these furnish the basis
75. On Sunday, July 7, 2002, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
which had been scrutinizing the conduct of Enron's board over the previous six months,
issued a report concluding that "much that was wrong with Enron was known to the board:'
This knowledge, according to the report, extended to the aggressiveness of Enron's
accounting practices, the conflict of interest transactions, the extensive off-the-books
corporate fimancings and transactions, and rampant excess executive compensation. The
Senate Subcommittee learned that the Finance Committee of Enron's board had been shown a
chart illustrating that Enron could be forced to issue tens of millions of new shares in the
event that its stock value declined, as a result of the "conflicted" off-balance sheet
transactions with the Raptors. GovernmentalAffairs Investigations Subcommittee Report;
supranote 51.
76. SeeKahn, Pandora Box, supranote 31, at 609-24. In 2001, Enron director Lord
John Wakeham received $72,000 as a consultant for Enron, in addition to his compensation
as a director. Joann S. Lublin, Inside, OutsideEnron Audit PaneIsScrutinized,WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 2002, at Cl. In relation to corporate charitable contributions' potential to impair
outside directors' objectivity, Enron directors Charles A. Lemaistre and John Mendelsohn
both served as senior executives of the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center-a
hospital that received more than $600,000 in gifts from Enron since 1996. Jo Thomas &
Reed Abelson, How a Top Medical ResearcherBecame Entangled with Enron,N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2002, at Cl. The New York Thnesreported that Enron contributed $50,000 to the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, where Wendy L. Gramm, formerly an Enron
director, was also a director. See Lublin, supra, at C1; Theo Francis, Questioningthe Books:
WaiverApproved forEnron DirectorMay Cut HerLosses,WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2002, at A8.
Enron also made significant campaign contributions to Dr. Gramm's husband, Senator Phil
Gramm. Francis, supra, at A8; Richard W. Stevenson & Jeff Gerth, Web ofSafeguardsFailed
as Enron Fell,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at 1; Lublin, supra,at C1.
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for ensuring accurate internal and external reporting and legal
compliance as a general matter."
Comprehensive, accurate
information gathering and reporting is essential to keeping
corporations running honestly and efficiently, of course. And the
receipt of accurate, comprehensive financial data is equally essential
for the board to fulfill its obligation of evaluating the competency of a
firm's senior management.
As documented by the Powers Report and a July 2002 report of a
Senate investigative committee, Enron's board failed to live up to both
of these essential duties."
Enron's directors failed to inform
themselves adequately about the integrity and performance of the
company's senior-most executives-especially in relation to such
executives' participation in highly lucrative related party transactions,
to the company's profound detriment."
In fact, a preliminary report authored by Vinson & Elkins,
Enron's lead outside counsel, indicates that Enron's board at least twice
expressly waived the company's code of conduct so that Enron
executives could participate in lucrative self-dealing transactions with
certain off-balance sheet entities." The report also suggests that the
board contemplated that additional safeguards would be instituted vis4-vis these transactions, but it does not appear that the directors ever
made efforts to follow up on whether such safeguards were instituted
77.

AMERICAN LAW INSTruTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.02

(1994) (Functions and Powers of the Board); id § 3.05 (Audit Committee in Large, Publicly
Held Corporations); CorporateGovernanceandAmerican Competiiveness: A Statement of
the BusinessRoundtable,46 Bus. LAW. 241 (1990) ("The board of directors has five primary
functions: (1) Select, regularly evaluate, and, if necessary, replace the [CEO] ... (5) Review
the adequacy of systems to comply with all applicable laws/regulations:); The Corporate
Directors' Guidebook-1994 Editon, 49 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1249 (1994). The Guidebook
explains that the board's oversight responsibility includes:
[E]valuating the performance of the corporation and its senior management and
taking appropriate action, including removal, of management when warranted;
adopting policies of corporate conduct, including compliance with applicable laws
and regulations, and maintenance of accounting, financial, and other controls;
reviewing the process of providing appropriate financial and operational
information to decisionmakers (including board members).
Id
78. For discussion, see, for example, Lowenstein, supra note 3 1, at 1342-45.
79. PowERs REPORT, supra note 27; Governmental Affairs Investigations Subcommittee Repor4 supranote 51.
80. PowERs REPORT, supra note 27; Governmental Affairs Investigations
Subcommittee Repor4 supranote 51.
81.
Enron's board of directors waived the company's code of conduct to permit
related party transactions between corporate insiders and the off-balance sheet entities in June
and October of 1999. V & E Report, supra note 27, at 5.
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or complied with; and evidently they were not. 2 Instead, at bes4 the
directors inappropriately, passively relied on other corporate officers
and preexisting inadequate information gathering and reporting
systems to protect Enron's interests. 3 Although the states' corporate
laws afford directors substantial discretion to rely on other officers'
and outside advisers' advice, the exculpatory effect of such reliance is
neither absolute nor uniform within the states' case law. Thus, the
scope of Enron board's "justifiable" reliance on their colleagues and
counselors will surely be a matter of contention in the private civil
suits filed against the company under state law.
Enron's board also failed in its basic obligation to scrutinize the
company's choice and implementation of accounting and disclosure
82. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 27; see alsoTestimony of Jordan Mintz, general
counsel of Enron's Global Finance Division. Mintz was sufficiently concerned about the
conflict-ridden transactions with the Raptors, inter alia, as well as the underreporting of them,
that in the spring of 2001 he engaged the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson to review the situation. Mintz tried and failed to raise the issue of the conflict
transactions with Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's then-CEO, but he did not approach the board
directly with his concerns, as is now required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R.
3763, § 307, 107th Cong. (2002). In addition to being aired on C-Span, Mr. Mintz's
testimony regarding Enron's senior officers' and board's failed responsiveness to the
executives' conflicts and the perils they posed to Enron was reported extensively in the press.
Eichenwald & Henriques, supra note 34, at Al ("Questions of Conflicts-A Corporate
Lawyer Raises Red Flags").
83. Directors' ability to exculpate themselves from liability based on their
"justifiable" reliance on other corporate officers and outside experts and the proper
functioning of corporate internal control systems is hotly contested in contemporary
corporate law, notwithstanding its statutory basis. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 65.357(2)
(2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 141(e) (2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney
2001); Inre W.R.Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39,156, 65 SEC Docket 1236
(Sept. 30, 1997), availableat 1997 WL 600685 (holding that directors cannot passively rely
on other corporate personnel and existing control systems to produce the disclosures required
by law). Oregon's director reliance statute provides:
In discharging the duties of a director, a director is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports or statements including financial statements and other financial
data, if prepared or presented by:
(a)
One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(b) Legal counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters the director
reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert competence; or
(c) A committee of the board of which the director is not a member, if the
director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
OR. REV. STAT. § 65.357(2). "Justifiable reliance" will surely be a principal defense put
forward by Enron's directors and officers, especially vis-i-vis their auditors, Arthur Andersen,
and outside lawyers, Vinson & Elkins. The specter of the various Enron participants seeking
to avoid liability by casting blame on one another (i.e., pleading reliance interse)illustrates
the urgent need for further theorizing about individual versus entity-based responsibility for
corporate malfeasance.
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practices.'
Boards' obligations to oversee the accuracy of their
companies' public disclosures is reflected in both the corporate
fiduciary case law 5 and the SEC's pronouncements issued under its
authority to oversee the integrity of corporate reporting. 6 This
oversight responsibility is also widely acknowledged in the quasiauthoritative professional literature addressed to directors, such as the
publications of the American Law Institute, the Business Roundtable,
and the American Bar Association." Enron directors' disclosurerelated failures" facilitated the related party transactions and failed
auditing that, in conjunction with each other, weakened confidence in
the company until it finally collapsed.
Investor confidence in the integrity of public accounting firms'
audits was another pillar of the corporate governance system that was
84. SeePOwERs REPORT, supranote 27.
85. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
86. Sarbanes-Oxley imposes substantive requirements on corporate boards' audit
committees. SeeH.R. 3763, § 301. Prior to the most recent wave of corporate accounting
scandals, the SEC's and most commentators' focus had been on improving the functioning of
corporate audit committees through heightened d'sclosureof audit committee procedures and
conduct. SeeAudit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 42,266, 64 Fed. Reg.
73,389, 73,390 (Dec. 30, 1999); see also REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AuDIT COIMmIrrTEEs (1999) (discussing
financial reporting abuses and the proper role of audit committees in preventing them). But
the SEC has also made clear that the full board itself, including outside directors, bears
responsibility for the quality of disclosure. See, e.g., L7 reW.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 39,156, 65 SEC Docket 1236 (Sept. 30, 1997), availableat 1997 WL 600685; In
re Gibson Greetings Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 36,357, 60 SEC Docket 1154 (Oct. 11,
1995), available at 1995 WL 597476; InreThe Cooper Companies, Exchange Act Release
No. 35082, 58 SEC Docket 591 (Dec. 12, 1994), availableat 1994 WL 707149; Report of
Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation, Exchange Act Release No.
11,516,7 SEC Docket 298 (July 12, 1975), availableat 1975 WL 163038.
87. See supranote 77 and accompanying text.
88. Members of Congress were considering affording the SEC authority, in its own
right, to bar directors and officers held to be "unfit" from holding such positions with public
companies in the future. Instead, as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC may use its authority
to persuade a federal court to bar from service an officer or director who is "unfit"---the old
standard being "substantially unfit." H.R. 3763, § 305; see Jayne W. Bamard, The SEC
Suspension andBarPowersin Perspective,76 TuL. L. REv. 1253 (2002). As a mechanism of
ensuring greater accountability and accuracy in financial reporting, Sarbanes-Oxley requires
that public companies' senior-most officers (e.g., the CEO and CFO) must certify their firm's
financial statements and may face criminal penalties, including incarceration, if they
"recklessly and knowingly" allow the publication of fraudulent information. SeeH.R. 3763,
§§ 302, 906. Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the "books and records"
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), as incorporated in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b)(5), amendedbyPub. L. No. 107-123, 115 Stat. 2390 (2002)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2001)) provided that it was a crime for corporate
managers to lie to company auditors. Nevertheless, enforcement was rare and statutory
penalties for violations of the FCPA were relatively minor.
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severely damaged by Enron's fall. Despite former SEC chairman
Arthur Levitt Jr.'s vigorous efforts to implement reform in the area of
auditors' conflicts of interests,' 9 prior to Congress's enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in late July 2002, widespread financial conflicts
of interest arising from the bundling of auditing and consulting
services frequently would have impaired auditors' objectivity in the
performance of corporate audits. Such conflicts were present in
Arthur Andersen's auditing of Enron. Andersen made $27 million in
2000 from consulting services billed to Enron, in aditon to the $25
million it made from auditing Enron." Until Enron fired Andersen in
January 2002, Enron had been Andersen's second-largest client."
Andersen's desire to retain Enron's lucrative consulting work (in
addition to Enron's auditing work) would have dampened Andersen's
objectivity in the audit. The handsome consulting fees may have
nullified the audit partners' resolve to walk away from a client that had
refused to follow sound accounting and disclosure practices."
Although the Big Five accounting firms had revolted against
Arthur Levitt's proposals to prohibit individual accounting firms from
performing both consulting and auditing work for the same client in
1999, the Enron-related crisis in confidence vis-A-vis the auditing
profession has given rise to substantial impetus for separating auditing
and consulting work in order to promote the independence, and
investors' faith in the independence, of corporate auditing. PostEnron, such change has been evolving through voluntary reforms
undertaken by the major accounting firms themselves, but even more
89. In 1999, under Arthur Levitt Jr.'s leadership, the SEC proposed a rule that would
have banned an accounting firm from performing audit and (most) consulting work for the
same company. The SEC's proposal provoked an intense lobbying campaign on the part of
the Big Five accounting firms, and in November 2000, the SEC instead enacted standards
that banned only a fraction of consulting work by auditing firms. See Revision of the
Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, SEC Release No. 7919, 73 SEC Docket
1885 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1726933. Again, Sarbanes-Oxley enacts
significant new substantive limits on firms' performance of nonaudit consulting work for
their audit clients. SeeH.R. 3763, § 201.
90. These fees are disclosed in Enron's Form 10-K, supranote 15.
91.
Scott Hensley & Jonathon Weil, InAnotherBlow,Andersen IsSackedasMerck§
Auditor,WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2002, at AlO. In a July 5,2002, SEC filing, Merck announced
that it booked $12.4 billion in revenue that it never collected. For commentary, see Barbara
Martinez, Merck Booked $12.4 Billion That It Never Collected,WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at
Al. By that date, Arthur Andersen had been crushed by its conviction for obstruction of
justice vis-A-vis its destruction of Enron documents.
92. The controversiality of the Enron audit within Arthur Andersen itself is evidenced
by the fact that records document disagreement between audit partners in Houston (who ran
the Enron show) and those in the Chicago office (whose views were solicited but then
ignored).
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significantly through congressionally and SEC-mandated changes.
Only time will tell whether these reforms go far enough in restoring
investor confidence; whether receipt of a clean audit opinion will once
again be a meaningful signifier.
Thirdly, the presence of financial conflicts of interest on the part
of sell-side financial analysts may explain the curious fact that
although Enron's financial statements were widely acknowledged as
being chronically opaque, that opacity was not punished in the market
6t la Akerlof 3 in the form of widespread "sell" recommendations (at
least not prior to mid-2001).94 By February 2002, members of several
House and Senate subcommittees had began formal inquiries into the
question of whether analysts' oddly longstanding "buy" recommendations on Enron's stock-recommendations that remained in place in
many cases, until immediately prior to the company's bankruptcy
filing-were influenced by the fact that their Wall Street employers
had obtained (or might obtain) lucrative investment banking deals or
other investment opportunities from Enron or its affiliates." And
through the summer of 2002, New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer
continued his broad investigation of Wall Street research department
conflicts arising from their affiliation with the investment banking
departments of their firms.96

93.
See George Akerlof, The Market for 'emons"
Quality Uncertaintyand the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Charles Gasparino & Tom Hamburger,
CongressBroadens Probe ofEnron Fall to Wall Street Fims, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at
Cl.
94. Enron's stock reached a high of $90 per share in August 2000, and, after various
peaks and valleys, was still trading at $80 per share in early 2001. By the late spring it had
declined below $60 per share, and continued to decline, progressively but persistently from
then on. These figures are reflected in Enron's SEC filings during the period, as well as in
detailed schematics published in the New York Times. See, e.g., Eichenwald, supra note 38,
atAl.
95. See Leslie Wayne, Congress§Scrutiny Shlls to Wall Street andIts Enron Role,
N.Y. TIMs, Feb. 19, 2002, at Al. Senator Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman of the Senate
Commerce subcommittee investigating the matter, stated "We're trying to understand whether
Wall Street firms had a vested interest to pump up Enron stock." Id Merrill Lynch
underwrote the sale of partnership interests and invested in certain of these interests in
connection with Enron's off-balance sheet partnerships. A Merrill Lynch spokesperson
testified before Congress on this conflicts issue at the end of July 2002.
96. In August 2002, AT&T announced that it had received a subpoena from Eliot
Spitzer's office relating to whether Salomon Smith Barney's Jack Grubman had inflated his
rating of AT&T shares in order to promote Salomon's chances of a role in a $10.6 billion
offering of AT&T shares. See Seth Schiesel & Gretchen Morgenson, AT&TIs Asked for
Information on Dealings with Salomon, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at C1.
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ENRON AS A FORCE IN AND A PRODUCT OF A DEREGULATED,
LEGALLY PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT

Through evidence offered to congressional investigators, the
findings of the Powers Report, and reports by the media, it has become
clear that Enron's illicit, at times unlawful, behavior was facilitated by
an excessively permissive legal environment. Indeed, the atmosphere
that pervaded not only business and Wall Street, but also the political
and even legalacademic establishment throughout the last two decades
has been trenchantly "antilaw?' Hostility to the "costly" intrusions of
law and government may have seemed like an affordable luxury prior
to September 1lth and the post-millennial accounting scandals, but the
costs of law and the legal process can now more accurately be
compared to the costs of lawlessness and the economic and socialpsychological insecurity engendered thereby. In this regard, Al
Qaeda's attacks of September 11th and the fall of Enron appear to have
signaled the end of a socio-political and legal era.97
By its own description, Enron was "laser-focused" on enhancing
profits. This objective was achieved, in significant part, by avoiding
the cost and constraints imposed by compliance with laws and
regulations."
In many cases, for example, in relation to the
97. In a mid-July 2002 speech to business leaders at the University of Alabama,
President Bush criticized the lack of ethical conduct, greed, and hyperconcentration on
earnings that had roiled the markets:
In order for us to have the security we all want, America must get rid of the
hangover that we now have as a result of the binge, the economic binge we just
went through. We were in a land of endless profit. There was no tomorrow when
it came to the stock markets and corporate profits. And now we're suffering a
hangover from that binge.
Excerpts from PresidentBush Address on the Economy,N.Y TIMES, July 16, 2002, at C5.
It is fascinating to see that Bush identified the need to promote corporate transparency and
ethical corporate leadership as a matter of national "security.' It is also fascinating and telling
that in addressing these problems of corporategovernancein his speech, Bush emphasized
the need to "hold people accountable for misdeeds i thepublicsector.... It is important for
corporate America to hear this call. In order to be a responsible American, you must behave
responsibly. We expect there to be full disclosure of assets and liabilities" Id. (emphasis
added). Corporate affairs have traditionally been shielded from regulation on the notion that
they are "private,' although oversight over the accuracy of corporate disclosure has more
generally been acknowledged as having "public" dimensions.
98. In the Letter to Shareholders in Enron's 2000 Annual Report to Shareholders,
Jeffrey Skilling (Enron's President and CEO at the time) and Kenneth L. Lay (Enron's
Chairman at the time) describe Enron as "laser-focused on earnings per share?' SeeENRON,
supranote 18, at 2. In the summer of 2002, concern about the veracity of corporate earnings'
figures was substantially to blame for extraordinary market volatility. On July 16, 2002, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged 440 points (5%) before closing with a net loss of only
45 points. The panicked trading was compared in press reports to that following September
11 th. For other data on recent stock market performance, see Appendix B, hl2fa see also
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(non)payment of federal income taxes in four of the five years prior to
its bankruptcy, Enron accomplished this by artfully structuring the
legal entities, the several thousand foreign and domestic subsidiaries,
through which it conducted business. A similarly formalistic, strategic
(but ultimately unprofitable) approach to corporate affairs was evident
in Enron's financial dependence on special purpose entities and offbalance sheet transactions. In other cases, for example, the Investment
Company Act's (non)application to its foreign operations, 9 Enron used
its political influence to win particular exemptions from laws and
regulations. The exemption from the Investment Company Act, which
was granted to Enron in 1997 by the SEC after the company had
extensively lobbied Congress and the Commission, was crucial to
enabling Enron's expansion, and subdivision, into a nearly
unfathomable multitude of foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. Again,
these entities were useful in reducing or eliminating Enron's liability
for federal income taxes, moving debt and depreciated property off
Enron's books, and facilitating insiders' self-dealing transactions.
Significantly, Enron's extensive lobbying of cabinet officials,
Congress, and federal agencies fostered the deregulation of electricity
and other commodities markets, ' as well as the absence of oversight
and regulation in over-the-counter traded derivatives-areas that were
crucially important to the company's bottom line.'0 ' In some cases,
Jonathan Fuerbringer, The Dow TakesAnotherBeating,Failing355Points,N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
4, 2002, at Cl. August represented the fifth month of declining prices for the Dow and
NASDAQ; the first such sustained decline since 1981 for the Dow and since 1984 for the
NASDAQ. Id.
99. See Stephen Labaton, Exemption Won in '97 Set Stage for Enron Wbes, N.Y
TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2002, atAl.
100. Enron's political influence was not the impetus for the deregulation of electricity
markets, but Enron's lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions helped fuel the
momentum behind the federal government's deregulatory agenda. Enron kept a highly
aggressive, expert lobbying staff of approximately twenty-eight members in Washington. In
addition, Enron paid lobbying expenses of approximately $2.1 million to a dozen or so
Washington lobbying firms. See Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, The Eron Debacle
Spotlights Huge Voidin Financia/Rqgulaon,WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2001, at Al. The Center
for Responsive Politics describes Enron's lobbying expenses as having doubled since 1997.
Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Enron: OtherMoneyinPolticsStats-LobbyingExpenditures,
available at http://vwww.opensecrets.org/news/enron/enronsother.asp (last updated Jan. 29,
2002). Arthur Andersen also invested astounding sums in lobbying and campaign
contributions from the mid-1990s until its demise in 2002.
101. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000), passed by Congress in the final days of 2000, protected Enron from futures regulation
and oversight of its derivatives trading business. According to the Wall Street Journal,
"Enron was so forceful in pushing for energy and metals commodities to be exempted from
oversight that the exemption provision was sometimes referred to by Capitol Hill staff as the
'Enron Point."' See Schroeder & Ip, supranote 100, at Al.
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Enron was simply able to leverage its financial and institutional
resources to innovate more rapidly than those who might otherwise
have tried to regulate it. EnronOnline, a cyberspace-based energy
trading "market" launched by Enron in 1999, was immune to many of
the regulations that applied to its traditional, "corporeal" counterparts,
such as the New York Mercantile Exchange. 2 Other regulatory
oversights nearly defy explanation. Remarkably, prior to Enron's fall
2001 financial crisis, the SEC had last reviewed the substance of the
company's filings and reports in 1997! Even as he appeared before
Congress, the recently appointed SEC Chairman, Harvey Pitt, had no
explanation for the hiatus.
Most contemporary practitioners and academicians in corporate
law have hailed the prevailing legal "enablingism" and regulatory
minimalism as promoting corporate profits and economic efficiencyand thus the broader social welfare. But the Enron story is a
cautionary tale illustrating the limits of "governance through markets"
and the shortcomings of relying nearly exclusively on short-term profit
maximization as the animating principle of corporate governance,
laws, and market and financial regulation. In regard to the former
concept, while markets may adjust ex post to colossal failures such as
Enron's, a predominantly trial and error, post-hoc approach to
safeguarding the welfare of firms, investors, and employees is
intolerably costly. Timing matters to the people who have "skin in the
game," and should therefore matter to the people with the power to
implement reform. 3 In addition, some of the salutary, ex post market
response that fuels the antiregulatory argument occurs in anticipation
of what is feared might be an otherwise impending, potentially more
onerous legal response. This phenomenon may in fact explain the
decision of certain companies and financial firms, in the summer of
2002, "voluntarily" to expense the cost of stock option grants.
"Voluntary" reforms may produce superior public relations or investor
response, and may, in some cases, even supplant the need for "topdown" legal or regulatory action. But such "voluntary" reforms might
102. According to the Wall Street Journafs figures, EnronOnline came to control a

quarter of all wholesale energy trades among U.S. utilities, independent power producers, and
other market players. At its peak, Enron's portfolio of energy and other derivatives was
valued at $19 billion. See id. Because over-the-counter traded derivatives fall outside of the
jurisdiction of both the SEC and the CFTC, "financial regulators had little clue what was
going on inside Enron" Id.
103. It would surely be intolerable to leave the regulation of air travel safety largely to
post-hoc, market responses to major disasters, or national security to post-hoc responses to
major terrorist attacks.
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never come if there were not a credible threat of legal action. Of
course, laws and regulations, like markets, are imperfect in their
operation-but the gravity and magnitude of the interests at stake in
the American corporate governance and capital market systems
mandate that perfect solutions cannot be allowed to be the fatal enemy
of sound legal and regulatory reforms.
A more meaningful, activist role for law and regulation is
validated, also, by the research of behavioral economists. Research
findings vis-A-vis the operation of cognitive biases (the overconfidence
principle, risk aversion, endowment effects, etc.) and other forms of
"bounded rationality" indicate that individual investors and employees
are frequently less than ideally situated to make materially welfareenhancing choices in their dealings with firms and markets. Such
biases were surely at work, for example, in Enron employees'
investment decisions vis-a-vis the amount of company stock they own
in their 401(k) accounts. And this pattern of excess employee
concentration in employer stock is apparently widespread.
In addition, serious economic analysis no longer supports an easy
equivalence between the maximization of corporate profits and the
maximization of social welfare.
Concerns about substantial,
increasing inequality of wealth and income in the United States cannot
be relegated to second order, ex post political solutions. This is true
for several reasons, including the fact that these political solutions will
frequently fail to materialize because of the operation of the very
disparities of wealth, and the political empowerment of corporate
wealth in particular, that would otherwise be the stimulus for
progressive legal and regulatory reform.
In addition, ironically, while mainstream corporate legal scholars
and conservative policy makers have championed market-based
solutions to problems of suboptimal corporate governance (in light of
its presumed detrimental effect on corporate financial performance), at
least pre-Enron they frequently have opposed the adoption of more
aggressive legal measures that would tend to safeguard the accuracy of
the corporate disclosures that drive capital market's pricing of sharesand, thus, the market-based accountability mechanisms that
purportedly supplant the need for robust legal enforcement in the area
The mainstream, conservative legal
of corporate governance.
argument has been that entity-based penalties and fines for corporate
misrepresentation are misplaced and ineffectual; whereas imposing
financial damages directly on corporate directors and officers, it has
been argued, is too draconian. The supposedly shareholder-friendly
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argument has been that stricter laws and larger financial penalties
would too commonly deter talented people from serving as part of
corporate management, and especially as outside directors.
But it is difficult not to regard the deterrent-to-corporate-service
argument as a cynical one in a world where Enron's outside directors,
for example, received annual compensation approaching $400,000,
and firemen and policemen, in comparison-including many of those
who valiantly responded to the terror of September 11th, typically
make no more than fifteen to twenty percent of that sum. The problem
may be in the perception, the social and legal construction of what
interests are at stake, what duties are involved in serving as a corporate
director. In any case, from a liability perspective, if damages were
capped at disgorgement of the sum of salary and bonuses/benefits
received during the period in which the fraud was ongoing (as is
suggested in the conclusion to this Part IV of this Article), the
argument in favor of personal financial damages in cases where
directors and officers have been found to have participated in or
tolerated corporate fraud becomes a truly compelling one.
In the alternative, the standards for bringing and winning private
suits for fraud against corporate directors and officers under both the
federal securities laws and state corporate fiduciary duty law have
changed substantially during Enron's lifetime-consistently in the
direction of reducing or eliminating the payment of money damages
by corporate defendants and their advisors. In addition, in many cases,
broad federal preemption has foreclosed the possibility of pursuing
securities fraud claims through state law-based class actions, as
discussed hia.
After 1985 (coincidentally the year that Enron was created
through a merger with the Internorth pipeline company of
Nebraska),"f Delaware's legislature enacted laws permitting companies
to exculpate their directors from paying monetary damages in
fiduciary care suits, even where the directors' gross negligence has
been proven.' °5 Most states have followed Delaware in statutorily
sanctioning such limited director financial responsibility. OregonEnron is an Oregon corporation-adopted such a statutory charter
exculpation provision, and consistent therewith, Enron's charter
104. Enron was born out of Kenneth Lay's realization that in a heated takeover
environment, the best mode of survival was combining with another, larger entity. In 1985,
he engineered his pipeline company's merger with Internorth of Nebraska. Mitchell Pacelle,
Enron Creditorsto Seek OusterofLay,WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2002, at A3.
105.

DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
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exculpates its directors for monetary damages arising from breaches of
fiduciary care.' 6 Consequently, Enron's directors may be proven to
have been grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves about the
significance of the related party transactions, the viability of the
hedges in the off-balance sheet partnerships, and the "remoteness"
(and thus reportability) of the liabilities therein; grossly negligent in
failing to oversee the accuracy of the firm's disclosures to shareholders
generally;. 7 and grossly negligent in overseeing the implementation of
sound accounting practices-and they would still be exonerated from
monetary liability for damages accruing to Enron and its shareholders
as a result of the above described negligence by virtue of the
exculpatory clause in Enron's charter. It is notable in the alternative,
however, such charter exculpation from liability for financial damages
for breach of care does not apply either to corporate officers or
corporate auditors. Indeed, under state corporation law, Arthur
Andersen's auditors may be found to have aided and abetted a
fiduciary breach by Enron's directors and/or officers, as described
/i.fi2 108

106. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(d) (1993); see Enron, Revised Certificate of
Incorporation, Article XVI. The article states:
A director of the Corporation shall not be held personally liable to the Corporation
or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,
except for liability (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty ...(ii) for acts
or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law, ... (iv) for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit.
Id.; Enron's Revised Certificate of Incorporation is available on line through EDGAR, as an
exhibit to Enron's Form 10-K, filed April 1, 1995. The "bad faith" and "improper benefits"
limitations on exculpation may be of importance in corporate litigation against Enron's
directors. As stated in the text, significantly, statutory charter exculpation is inapplicable to
corporate officers, including Enron's officers.
107. In the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court held that corporations' charter
exculpatory clauses may serve to insulate directors from good faith, "negligent" disclosure
breaches. See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc'y for Savs. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
108. Aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty remains alive as a claim under
state corporate fiduciary law, although it is no longer recognized as a basis for recovery under
Rule 10b-5, after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Centrl Bank v First
InterstateBank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). In Malone v Brinca4 the Delaware courts entertained
an "aiding and abetting" claim against the accountants for Mercury Finance Company, based
on the accountants' participation in publishing fraudulent financial reports. See722 A.2d 5
(Del. 1998). For consideration of fiduciary law's importance as an adjunct to securities law in
setting standards for directors' diligent, honest conduct vis-A-vis disclosure, see Kahn,
Transparency,supm note 31. Although the GeorgiaLaw Review piece was published after
the international financial/currency crisis of 1998 (in which American regulators and
politicians decried "crony capitalism" in Asia, Russia, and elsewhere) and a succession of
financial accounting scandals had already engulfed several major companies including
Cendant, Sunbeam, Waste Management, and Oxford Health Systems, because the economy
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A pro-defendant orientation is evident also in recent United
States Supreme Court decisions addressing federal remedies for
corporate fraud. The Supreme Court has continued and expanded the
trend, initiated in the late 1970s,"9 of limiting the availability of
Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as bases for
plaintiffs to recover financial damages for fraudulent statements and
materially misleading omissions. In its 1991 decision in Lampf v
Gilbertson, the Supreme Court effectively shortened the statute of
limitations for bringing securities fraud claims under Rule lOb-5 to
three years after the date of the fraud or one year after its discovery by
the plaintiff."' In regard to Enron, fraudulent financial reports dating
back to 1997 and most of 1998 would be nonlitigable under this
standard."'
In 1994, in the case of CenhalBank v FrstlnterstateBat* the
Supreme Court held that Rule lOb-5 cannot be used as a basis for
federal suits alleging "secondary" liability for securities fraudincluding, most relevantly, claims against corporate auditors for
"aiding and abetting" the promulgation of fraudulent corporate
reports."' Thus, if Enron investors who have suffered financial losses
intend to use Rule lOb-5 as a basis for recovering damages against
Enron's auditors on account of their faulty auditing, they will have to
demonstrate that the auditors were primary paicipants in the
company's promulgation
of fraudulent financial reports.
Provocatively, the distinction between primary and secondary (aiding
and abetting) liability, and thus the viability of Rule lOb-5 claims
against Enron's auditors, is presently unclear. It is possible that
Andersen's auditors could be adjudged primary participants in any
Enron frauds that are proven as these claims make their way through
the federal courts. In addition, the controversy surrounding Andersen's
and stock market remained strong, talk of increased penalties for fraud, widespread "earnings
management," and lax accounting and disclosure oversight was unpopular and regarded
generally as alarmist.
109. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 US. 462 (1977) (holding that deception,
not merely coercion or unfairness, is required to proceed with a claim under Section 10(b));
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that scienter is required for claims
under Section 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US. 723 (1975) (holding
that only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to sue under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act).
110. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 US. 350 (1991).
111. This is a notable prospective change enacted by Sarbanes-Oxley. The Act
mandates that the statute of limitations in federal securities lawsuits will be two years after the
fraud's discovery for five years after the fraud, at a maximum. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, H.R. 3763, § 804, 107th Cong. (2002).
112. CentralBan;511 US. at 164.
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failed auditing of Enron might provide the impetus for Congress to
exercise its authority to reverse the effect of CentralBank.
But congressional activism has run in the opposite direction in
recent, pre-Enron years. The "antiliability" orientation evident in the
Supreme Court decisions described above was accelerated in 1995 by
Congress's enactment (over the veto of then-President Clinton) of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)."3 As part of its
procedural innovations intended to curb "vexatious" fraud suits, the
PSLRA raised the standard for pleading fraud in federal securities law
cases." 4 Many courts and commentators also found it significant that
in the PSLRA Congress failed to codify that recklessness satisfies the
scienter standard where scienter is required under federal securities law
(as is the case for actions brought under Rule lob-5)." ' These changes
and standards are proving helpful to defendants in federal courts'
rulings on motions to dismiss, and may affect Enron-related litigation
in requiring that plaintiffs prove that the Enron defendants acted with
deliberateintentto defraud the company's investors.
The PSLRA also provides that discovery proceedings may be
stayed (i.e., halted) prior to the resolution of any defendants' motions
to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaints."6 In practice, the staying of
discovery in such a context, where the plaintiffs must plead their claim
with particularity, has frequently proven terminal to the plaintiffs'
claims, as it preserves the status quo of asymmetric information in
favor of the corporate defendants.
In addition, the PSLRA also eliminated joint and several liability
on the part of corporate defendants in cases where deliberate intent to
deceive investors is not proven."' Thus, even if recklessness is
determined to provide an adequate basis for recovery under Rule lOb113. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in sections of 15 U.S.C.). In addition, while Sarbanes-Oxley
provides for new criminal offenses and heightens penalties where fraud is proven, other than
extending the statute of limitations in securities fraud suits, it does nothing to make these
claims easier to bring or plaintiffs more likely to prevail. H.R. 3763, §§ 802, 804, 906.
114. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(b)(1)-(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000).
115. The confusion surrounding the PSLRA's effect on Section 10(b) and Rule 10-5's
scienter requirement "spilled over" into the legislative history of the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). In testimony that was consciously made part of
the SLUSA's legislative history, certain members of Congress attempted, retroactively, to
validate that even after the PSLRA, "recklessness" remained sufficient to establish scienter in
Rule lOb-5 litigation. The actual text of the SLUSA is silent on this point and the effect of
the SLUSA's legislative history on clarifying the meaning of "recklessness" and validating
that it satisfies the scienter requirement has proved inconclusive.
116. Securities Exchange Act § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
117. Id § 21D(f)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A).
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5, and even if Enron's auditors are determined to be primary, culpable
participants in Enron's securities fraud (so as to avoid the effects of
CentralBanA), consistent with the PSLRA, Arthur Andersen's auditors
cannot be held responsible for the full extent of the Enron plaintiffs'
losses unless they are proven to have acted with the intentof deceiving
Enron's investors. Because auditors are frequently the "deep pockets"
in suits alleging fraudulent financial reporting (because the exposure
of substantial accounting fraud on a company's part will often force it
into bankruptcy, as was true in Enron's and also WorldCom's case), the
PSLRA's limitation on joint and several liability was a highly
significant development in limiting auditors' financial exposure for
damages in securities fraud cases.
Congress subsequently reaffirmed the principal objectives of the
PSLRA (reducing "unmeritorious" and "vexatious" fraud suits against
American corporations), and solidified its effects by enacting the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) in 1998." In
enacting SLUSA, with limited exceptions, Congress barred private
plaintiffs from proceeding with class actions under state law where
fraud is alleged in relation to securities transactions involving
nationally traded securities (such as Enron's common stock). 9
Congress's reconsideration of the appropriate scope and locus of class
action litigation against corporations remains ongoing, and the
momentum continues to be in favor of using preemption to consolidate
class action suits in the federal courts, where stringent pleading,
scienter, and other pro-defendant procedural and substantive standards
can be made binding and uniform-consistent with the result in the
PSLRA and SLUSA'
118. Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in sections of 15 U.S.C.).
119. For excellent commentary on SLUSA, see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a
FalseAlarm: Federal PreempttonofState SecuitiesFraudCauses ofActton, 84 CoRNELL L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (1998).
120. On March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives passed H.R 2341, the socalled "Class Action Fairness Act,' by a vote of 233 to 190 (a dozen Democrats supported the
bill). Interestingly, the debate on H.R. 2341 appeared on C-Span intermittently with the
hearings on Enron's collapse. In contrast, the Senate's version of the bill (S.1712) was stalled
in the Judiciary Committee as late as August 2002. The current perception of widespread
unethical corporate conduct (which had sharper teeth in August than in March, when the
House voted) would make passage of the "Class Action Fairness Act" unpopular, if not
politically unfeasible. The House bill expands federal diversity jurisdiction in multistate class
actions where the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $2 million. If passed by the
Senate, the legislation is expected to result in a substantial movement of mass class action tort
cases to the federal courts (notwithstanding the longstanding concern about the federal
courts' excessive caseload)-a move that would facilitate further regulation of these cases by
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As the federalsecurities laws have grown increasingly significant
for and also unfriendly to investors seeking recoveries for losses
arising from fraudulent misstatements and omissions, state courts
interpreting (state) corporate fiduciary law have also continued to
resist imposing monetary liability on directors in both failure to
monitor and "fiduciary misrepresentation" cases.' In regard to the
former, in 1996, in an important Delaware decision approving the
settlement of a derivative suit, Chancellor William Allen stressed that
while corporate boards bear primary responsibility for overseeing the
implementation, maintenance, and effective operation of their firms'
information gathering and reporting systems, "only a sustained or
systematic failure... an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists-will establish the lack of
good faith that is a necessary condition to [board] liability."' Thus, if
Oregon's state courts follow Delaware's approach, it is highly unlikely
that Enron's directors would be held financially accountable for the
damages suffered by Enron shareholders as a result of the directors'
failure to oversee adequate systems of information gathering, internal
control, and legal compliance. This is true because inaction, in the
absence of director self-dealing, has never been regarded as being an
indicia of bad faith. The interesting question facing Enron's directors
is,therefore, whether their failure to perceive or publicize (or
implement systems that would reliably publicize) adverse corporate
the federal government. This class action "reform" legislation, unsurprisingly, has been
supported by major corporations and industrial lobbying groups. Its supporters describe the
proposed legislation as a vital, efficiency-enhancing response to plaintiffs' forum shopping
and, more generally, a tort system run amok. Consumer advocates and organizations such as
the National Conference of State Legislatures have, alternatively, denounced the legislation as
reflecting unwarranted skepticism about the competence and bona fides of state court judges
and inadequate respect for plaintiffs' rights to present their case in a convenient forum. In
April 2002, the American Bar Association established a special task force (headed by law
professor and former Tulane Law School dean Edward E Sherman) to consider the merits of
the legislation. For an overview of the broad range of mass civil tort actions that would be
federalized by the legislation, see Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, INS. ISSUES UPDATE,
June 2002 (available on Lexis). Although facially procedural in nature, this legislation, like
the PSLRA and SLUSA, has a clear, substantive purpose-to limit "vexatious class action
lawsuits" and reduce financial recoveries against American corporations (at the expense,
potentially of consumers and other persons injured in their interactions with corporations).
Of course, Congress's actions in enacting the PSLRA and SLUSA look vastly different in the
post-Enron era, and the rush to promote corporate cost savings over consumers' rights may
have stalled for a time.
121. Uni-marts, Inc. v. Stein, CIVA.Nos. 14713, 14893, 1996 WL 466961, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 12, 1996).
122. !nreCaremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); William
T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standardsof Review in Delaware
Corporate Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287 (2001).
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information will be deemed to be a "bad faith" product of their
personal interest in maintaining the company's stock price on account
of their options. The outcome of such a dispute might very well rest
on who is deemed to have the burden of proof, which will in turn
depend on whether the court reviews Enron's board's oversight and
disclosure conduct through the lens of the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty. Furthermore, as described above, even if Oregon's courts were
more willing than Delaware's to impose financial liability on Enron's
directors for their oversight and disclosure failures, the existence of
Enron's charter exculpatory clause will protect Enron's directors from
having to pay financial damages so long as neither bad faith nor the
receipt of illicit, private financial benefits is proven in connection
therewith.
In defending such a lax approach to the enforcement of fiduciary
standards, commentators have argued that the force of reputation, in
lieu of law, would lead boards to adopt and observe "best practices,'2 3
consistent with judicially articulated standards of conduct.
Influential professors of corporation law have defended social norms
as adequately, even optimally, functioning to discipline directors, at
least outside of what were thought to be the very rare cases of
egregious financial conflicts of interest. 4 The lack of diligence
exhibited by Enron's directors may make corporate legal academics
more skeptical of the notion that directors are sufficiently mindful of
their reputations so as to rise to the challenge of meaningful corporate
governance. In addition, as mentioned previously, prior to Enron's
collapse, insufficient attention had been focused on the fact that
granting directors and officers substantial stock options has
encouragedthem to "look the other way' or worse, even to hinder the
publicization of accurate information when signs of negative corporate
123. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw andSocialNorms,99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1253, 1291 (1999). For an argument about the salutary effect of social norms on
corporations and corporate participants, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands
of ConsciousPonwer Law,Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporamon,149 U PA. L. REv.
1619 (2001); see also Symposium, Norms and CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607
(2001). Rock and Wachter's article, and the social norms critique within academic corporate
law more generally, has been used as a rationale and justification for reduced legal
enforcement-a position consistent with the 1990s enthusiasm for deregulation.
Nevertheless, as of the summer of 2002, the political climate had turned radically in favor of
stronger regulatory and even criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R.
3763, § 906, 107th Cong. (2002). It will be interesting to see whether the "self-regulating"
corporation remains credible within academic corporate law in the post-Enron, postWorldCom environment. In this more critical vein, see Bratton, supranote 57.
124. Rock & Wachter, supranote 123.
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performance or deteriorated prospects have surfaced. In the face of
widespread granting of substantial stock options to corporate directors
and officers, judicial laissez faire is a dicey proposition.
Shareholder plaintiffs also face substantial impediments in using
fiduciary law as a basis for fraud claims against corporate directors
and officers. Most pertinent is the case of Malone v Brinca4 a
promising but problematic decision in which the Delaware Supreme
Court, in December 1998, overturned the Chancery Court's grant of
the director defendants' motion to dismiss the shareholders' complaint
(with prejudice).'
Outrageously, the Chancery Court had held that
even directors' knowing, deliberate participation in promulgating false
statements in SEC filings and other public disclosures would fail to
constitute a breach of such directors' fiduciary duties and corporate
governance obligations.'26 In overturning the lower court's ruling, the
Supreme Court took a strong, principled position-affirming that
directors' and officers' participation in the publication of materially
fraudulent statements, whether they are published directly to
shareholders or to the capital market in general (which includes the
company's shareholders) is fundamentally incompatible with the
directors' basic fiduciary obligations. Thus, in Malone, the Supreme
Court stated that honesty, including honesty in the publication of
corporate information relevant to shareholders and the capital market
in general, is a sine qua non of directors' fulfillment of their basic
fiduciary obligations.' 7
But the Delaware Supreme Court has stopped short, in Malone
and elsewhere, of establishing a fiduciary cause of action for alleged
fraud by directors or executive officers that can be asserted by
shareholders as a class action. The Malone Supreme Court appeared
to require that any shareholder recovery on a claim of "fiduciary
misrepresentation""'2 would be predicated on a plaintiff proving actual
reliance on the allegedly inaccurate statements-a requirement that
125. 722A.2d5, 14 (Del. 1998).
126. Malone v. Brincat, No. 15510, 1997 WL 697940 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1997), affin
part4 rev'dinpar4722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
127. Malone,722 A.2d at 14.
128. The terminology is mine. It reflects the fact that only shareholders have standing
to bring a "Malonecauseof action," as well as the now-accepted view that corporate directors
and officers owe their shareholders an affirmative duty of honesty whenever they speak to
shareholders (and even to the market in general, as it includes holders of the company's
shares). In addition to requiring that a plaintiff show actual reliance, the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Malone appears to require that materiality, scienter, causation, and actual
damages also need to be proven in order for a plaintiff to obtain a recovery but the precise
nature of the proofs required remains uncertain.
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precludes state corporate fiduciary suits for fraud (outside of mergers
or other corporate level transactions) from going forward as class
actions (as opposed to derivative or individual suits). 2 ' It remains to be
seen, however, whether courts in other states, and most intriguingly
Oregon's courts (because, again, Enron is an Oregon corporation), will
follow Delaware's precedent in imposing a requirement of actual
reliance on plaintiffs' use of fiduciary law as a mechanism for
recovering financial damages against directors and officers who have
perpetrated or tolerated fraudulent disclosure.
If this "strict
construction" prevails in regard to proving reliance, then Malone-like
claims of fiduciary representation will be useful, for the most part,
only in consolidated individual actions brought by larger, institutional
investors (such as the many pension funds who held Enron's stock!).
It is also significant in regard to Enron-related litigation that
although SLUSA preempted a substantial body of state fraud law, it
did not preempt state corporate fiduciary law suits brought by
defrauded holders of corporate securities. In these respects, Enron
may provide an important test case for the viability of state fiduciary
law as a vehicle for shareholder recoveries against directors and
officers who have allegedly participated in publishing fraudulent
corporate reports. Indeed, state "fiduciary misrepresentation" claims
brought by defrauded holders of Enron stock may be of particular,
strategic legal significance. Consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Ding Stores, holders of
corporate equity securities (including many holders of now nearly
worthless Enron common stock), as "nonpurchasers" and "nonsellers"
lack standing to bring claims under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 30 If
Enron's many institutional investors organize themselves to bring
consolidated individual state law fiduciary actions against Enron's
directors and officers alleging their lack of good faith participation in
effectuating accurate disclosure, they will be litigating at the cutting
edge of corporate fiduciary law.
One of the stumbling blocks facing the plaintiffs in Malone was
the difficulty of calculating the appropriate measure of damages in
129. This requirement of proving actual, individual reliance is not stated expressly in
the Supreme Court's opinion, but rather suggested indirectly at the conclusion of the opinion
through the court's reference to its decision in Gaffm v Teledyne, Inc. See Malone,722 A.2d
at 14.
130. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975). For a postMalone case in which the plaintiffs sued as defrauded holders of corporate equity securities
and escaped the preemptive effect of SLUSA, see Gordon v Buntrock,No. 00CV303, 2000
WL 556763, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28,2000).
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instances where holders had failed to sell, allegedly, on account of the
corporation's withholding of negative information.' In responding to
this challenge, state courts hearing fiduciary misrepresentation claims
against directors and officers should use the disgorgement remedy
invoked by the SEC in civil enforcement proceedings as a point of
departure. In situations where fraudulent conduct is proven, the SEC
can force the culpable parties, including corporate directors or officers,
to disgorge their illicit gains, and the Commission has authority to
make such recoveries available as a fund for injured parties.'32
Analogously, state courts hearing claims for fiduciary
misrepresentation, at least where directors' and/or officers' deliberate
fraud or reckless indifference to the publication of untruths has been
proven, should require such officials to disgorge the full amount of the
base and incentive compensation they received during the pendency of
the frauds. 3 Additionally, consistent with federal securities law
standards, neither indemnification nor insurance should be available to
the defendant directors and officers for damages payable on account of
131. The Delaware Supreme Court in Malonedid not expressly address the nettlesome
issue of how to compute damages vis-a-vis holders' claims; rather, it merely allowed the
plaintiff the right to replead so as to claim either direct, actual damages to himself as a
shareholder or damages to the corporation arising from the fraud through a derivative action.
The quandary of computing the proper measure of damages vis-a-vis holders' claims was
confronted head on by the justices sitting en banc in oral argument, and was a source of
considerable consternation for them and the litigants. See Transcript of the Rehearing en
Banc, Supreme Court of Delaware, Malone v. Brincat (Apr. 16, 1998) (No. 459,1997) ("And
analogizing to torts, as Justice Holland has done, I assume your clients are going to say: But
for these false disclosures, I would have sold my stock, retained my stock, purchased more
stock? What? Where does this lead in terms of damages?"). In point of fact, the problem of
ascertaining and awarding an "appropriate" amount and form of financial damages against
corporate insiders in suits alleging fraud, apart from the most straightforward of self-dealing
cases, has always been a deeply intransigent problem for the courts, both in corporate
fiduciary and securities fraud cases. This conceptual difficulty has frequently provided an
incentive for courts to rule against liability.
132. The SEC has authority under the Securities Exchange Act § 21(d)(3)(B) to
impose penalties up to the full amount of the pecuniary gain realized by a defendant as a
result of his or her violation of law. Under § 21(d)(3)(C)(i), such monies are ordinarily
payable to the United States Treasury. In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley includes important new
forfeiture provisions for CEOs and CFOs. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763,
§ 304, 107th Cong. (2002).
133. Disgorgement provides a less draconian remedy than holding insiders financially
liable for the full extent of the financial damages suffered by shareholder plaintiffs, and is
faithful to the bedrock principles of fiduciary law. See generallyBrudney,supanote 27. In
addition, disgorgement does not raise the kind of potentially constitutionally significant
property-based problems that imposing holding periods on insiders' stock options might. In
addition, providing for disgorgement as part of state law civil litigation provides a more
credible deterrent than does disgorgement in SEC administrative proceedings, in light of the
SEC's significantly limited enforcement resources.
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breaches of their fiduciary disclosure duties, at least where
recklessness or intent to deceive is proven.
This approach to the calculation of financial damages is
consistent with longstanding fiduciary precedent, which holds that
fiduciaries may not keep any gains achieved at the expense of their
beneficiaries. On this basis, state corporate fiduciary law has required
directors and officers who have profited from trading in their
companies' securities on the basis of confidential corporate
information to disgorge any such illicit gains.M In the case of
Diamond v Oreamuno, for example, a New York Court of Appeals
required such disgorgement even in the absence of a showing that
either the corporation or the plaintiffs were directly harmed by the
insiders' trades.'35 The point of the holding was that corporate
fiduciaries cannot use their privileged access to corporate information
as a basis for garnering profits for themselves.'36 Because a directors'
or officers' participation in corporate misrepresentation is a clear abuse
of the power attendant to their offices, and thus a breach of fiduciary
duty, any directors and officers who are proven to have participated in
fraud (either deliberately or recklessly) should not be allowed to retain
the base and bonus compensation they received in contemplation of
the fulfiilment of their duties.
In summary, while both state corporate fiduciary law and the
federal securities laws and regulations have supported the notion that
directors are responsible for overseeing the accuracy and integrity of
their firms' disclosures, and also overseeing the systems of
information gathering and reporting that furnish the basis for accurate
disclosure, both bodies of law have been extremely reluctant to give
force to these duties by imposing personal liability on corporate
directors and officers.'37 As the legal developments described above
134. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y 1969); Brudney, supr note 27, at
595.
135. Diamond248 N.E.2d at 910.
136. Id.
137. The distinction between articulated, essentially hortatory (and potentially
toothless) standards of "conduct" and standards of "liability," (i.e., those upon which
determinations regarding financial damages are based) is a salient one within corporate
fiduciary law in the disclosure/information gathering area. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722
A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); In reCaremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del Ch. 1996).
In the securities law area, the gap between the SEC's expressed disappointment with
directors' conduct vis-A-vis disclosure and the situations in which the SEC has imposed
financial damages on individuals in relation to faulty disclosure is evident, for example, in
Report of Investigation Pursuantto Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directorsof WR. Gmce & Co.,
Release No. 39,157, 65 SEC Docket 1240 (Sept. 30, 1997); In re Caterpillar Inc., Exchange
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have individually and in the aggregate reduced the likelihood that
companies and their executives will be liable for financial damages in
civil fraud suits, they are likely to have contributed to the sense of
"invincibility" that reportedly circulated among Enron's corporate
leaders,'38 and, potentially, more generally, to other corporations' and
corporate actors' willingness to view compliance with the prevailing
accounting standards as optional, or from a short-term wealth
maximization perspective, even sub-optimal.'39
Act Release No. 30532, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830 (Mar. 31, 1992). In addition, as
is widely recognized, the SEC's enforcement program has been hampered by an austerity
budget and severe understaffing. For the federal courts' reluctance to impose greater liability
for disclosure shortfalls, see, for example, Vgiia Bankshares, Inc. v Sandburg, 501 U.S.
1083 (1991).
138. Many Enron employees have now publicly described the sense of limitless power
and arrogance that pervaded Enron's corporate culture. This corporate narcissism was fueled
by Enron's tremendous political clout, financed by immense lobbying and campaign finance
expenditures. Enron executives had a similarly high-profile presence in the elite nonprofit
world, where the company spent millions and "hung its name on skyscrapers and sports
stadiums." As mentioned previously, Enron's collapse "left a dent of about $10 million in the
2002 budgets of local nonprofit institutions?' Morrice, supra note 39, at A23; Neela
Banerjee, At Enron,Lavish Excess Oflen Came Before Success,N.Y Tam.s, Feb. 26, 2002,
at C1 ("The company had set aside $1.5 million for a Christmas party at Enron Field,
Houston's sparkling new sports stadium, hoping to match the sumptuous gatherings of earlier
years. Only in mid-November 2001, when a ruined Enron was heading for bankruptcy and
trying to sell itself.., was the celebration finally called off?').
Enron's Jeffrey Skiling, who resigned as Enron's president and chief executive on
August 14,2001, exemplified this arrogance in his dealings with Enron employees. When he
was called to testify, it was also on display to members of Congress as well, apparently. For
popular accounts, see John Schwartz, Darth Vader Machiavelli Skilling Set Intense Pace,
N.Y TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2002, at Cl. The New York Times reported the recollections of one of
Skilling's colleagues:
I want to get rid of these walls, [Skilling] recalled telling a person he referred to as
the 'building Gestapo.' He wanted a big open room.... The 'building Gestapo,'
he said 'didn't get it.' After a big struggle... he simply 'hired contractors and had
them start ripping the valls out.' Under Mr. Skilling, the old rules no longer
applied. Literally and figuratively, the walls were coming down.' ... [Mr.
Skilling] exuded an intensity, marching through [Enron's offices] with his eyes
straight ahead, his body language radiating importance and urgency and making
clear that few should dare to take a moment of his time.
John Schwartz, As EnronPurgedIts Ranks, Dissent Was Swept Away, N.Y TIMiES, Feb. 4,
2002, at C 1; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Richard W. Stevenson, An EnronEx-ChiefUsesDefiant
Tone at Senate Hearig,N.Y TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at Al. The recent corporate corruption
scandals have featured outsized, hubristic CEO types; in addition to Enron's, there are
Adelphia's Rigases, Imclone's Samuel Waksal, Tyco International's Dennis Kozlowski,
WorldCom's Scott Sullivan-characters whose personae and financial maneuverings could
not be outdone by Tom Wolfe's. For an academic treatment of executive narcissism, see Jay
A. Conger, The DarkSide ofLeadership, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Fall 1990, at 44, 4455.
139. On July 29, 2002, Qwest Communications followed in the footsteps of its
accounting-challenged telecommunications peers (Adelphia, Global Crossing, WorldCom) in
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The hearings and investigations into Enron's collapse, launched
by Congress, the SEC, and the Department of Justice in early 2002,
were intended to address the financial conflicts of interest, breakdowns
in corporate governance, shortcomings in accounting and auditing
practice, and shortcomings in the law that facilitated the abusive
practices and abusive outlook described above.' 0 In the areas of
pension benefits, securities law, accounting and auditing practice, and
corporate governance, many salutary reforms have been endorsed by
members of Congress from both parties, the SEC, and private actors
representing the relevant corporate and financial interests
themselves."' And consideration of reform proposals in these and
other areas is ongoing. But Congress's tempered "inquisition" of
Enron, its principals, and their advisers has only partially been about
implementing positive legal and regulatory reform.
V

REPRESENTATIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE SYMBOLIC USES OF THE
ENRON HEARINGS

The congressional hearings into what transpired at Enron,
WorldCom, and other major companies implicated in accounting
frauds in the first half of 2002, as well as the multitude of firms that
profited from financing, advising, and opining about their affairs, have
served as purposeful forms of serious political theater.' 2 In particular,
the Enron proceedings constituted both a public ritual of mass
catharsis and also a right of political penitence on the members' parts.
announcing "a mere" $1.1 billion of transactions that were wrongly accounted for. Simon
Romero, Qwest Announces Accounting Flaws,N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at Al. Qwest's
practices had already been under investigation by the SEC and the Department of Justice at
the time the company made its announcement.
140. In the final days of July 2002, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations held hearings into whether Merrill Lynch and other major financial institutions
played a substantial role in hiding Enron's true financial condition. For an account of the
scope of the inquiry and the controversy surrounding Merrill Lynch's dealings with Enron,
see Richard A. Oppel, Jr., US. Studying Menill Lynch in Enron Deal,N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2002, at C I.
141. In addition to Sarbanes-Oxley and the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act
of 2002, also of relevance are (1) the Market Oversight Consolidation and OTC Derivatives
Regulation Act, H.R. 4038, 107th Cong. (2002), (2) the Tax Haven and Abusive Tax Shelter
Reform Act of 2002, S.2339, 107th Cong. (2002), (3) New Proposed NASD Rule 2712 and
Proposed Amendment of Rule 2710 (relating to the allocation and distribution of stock
offerings), and (4) the ongoing efforts to overhaul the federal bankruptcy laws.
142. The analogy to Elizabethan court performances, such as the Masques of Ben
Jonson, comes to mind. See BEN JONSON, THE COMPLETE MASQUES (Stephen Orgel ed.,
1969). This Part of the Article is inspired by the sociologically oriented political theory of
Murray Edelman. See MURRAY JACOB EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLrICS (2d ed.
1985); MURRAY J. EDELMAN, CONSTRUCINGTHE POLrICAL SPECTACLE (1988).

1630

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 76:1579

In addition, at the same time, the hearings gave members of Congress
a very public opportunity to attempt to reassert the authority of
government and law over seemingly corrupt, lawless corporate firms
and capital market participants. Indeed, it was ultimately the rule of
law-and the moral, legal, and practical authority of the federal
government-that was the protagonist in this drama, as challenged by
rogue firms, willful and greedy corporate leaders, and amoral, highly
volatile markets. As described previously, in the months after Enron's
collapse, a virtual tsunami of corporate financial accounting scandals
shattered the stability of the U.S. securities markets and the federal
government's ability to focus on diplomatic and military affairs.
Enron-and then WorldCom, Merck, Global Crossing, Qwest
Communications, and others-edged Al Qaeda, for the time being, out
of the New York Times' lead column.
The downturn in the stock markets was so severe by mid-summer
2002 that members of both parties in Congress were anxious that both
the economy's and their own political survival were in question. As
talk of a "double dip" recession mounted, the houses competed to pass
the more stringent bills;"' there was talk of Democrats retaking the
House of Representatives. While executives, investment types, and
most mainstream corporate legal academics had long touted markets'
Promethean powers of "self-correction," it seemed increasingly certain
that absent a strong governmental and legal response, the crisis in
investor confidence would dictate that that correction would continue
for some time to be downward. As a result, on July 30, 2002, tougher
criminal penalties for executives found guilty of fraud, more rigorous
prohibitions on auditor conflicts of interest, new provisions regarding
accounting oversight, audit committee conduct, whistle-blower
protections, and requirements for CEO and CFO verification of
corporate financial statements were enacted by Congress into federal
law. Although he had previously advocated a milder legislative
response than what was embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
President Bush ultimately endorsed the new federal law without
reservation. The financial turmoil, the depth of the nation's anxiety
about corporate corruption, and the widespread nature of the losses
143. Sarbanes-Oxley is based primarily on the terms of the Senate reform bill, S.
2763, introduced by Senator Paul Sarbanes, which was then reconciled in conference
committee with two House bills. The primary House reform bill, passed in April, was the
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002 (H.R.
3763), introduced by Representative Michael Oxley. A second, more aggressive House
reform bill, the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 (H.R. 5118) was introduced by
Representative James Sensenbrenner on July 15 and passed the next day.
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suffered by employees and investors had persuaded the conservative,
Republican President and a heretofore "states rights" friendly
Congress, quite remarkably, to enact what most commentators
regarded as the toughest federal corporate and financial laws since the
era of the Great Depression.
Several new congressional hearings and SEC and Justice
Department investigations into various forms of financial fraud and
unfair dealing had commenced in the spring and summer of 2002. But
the hearings and investigations into Enron continued to garner
particularly intense political and popular attention. The Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations inquired into Merrill
Lynch's switching the analysts covering Enron-presumably to ensure
that Enron would continue to receive highly favorable recommendations, which would, in turn, facilitate Merrill's participation in lucrative
Enron-related investment banking deals. In addition, congressional
investigators scrutinized Merrill's participation in certain transactions
that obfuscated Enron's true financial situation. In fact, the Enron
hearings represent a watershed-the last time that informed
commentators could wonder out loud whether the problems uncovered
were the function of a few "outliers," rather than the product of
fundamental shortcomings in law, government, and the prevailing
corporate culture.
Beginning in the early spring of 2002, the Enron hearings were
aired on C-Span, on some days around the clock, and lengthy
transcripts of the hearings were excerpted in the New York Times and
other major national newspapers. The numerosity of the hearings and
investigations was evidence of their "performative" nature: There was
no practical, functional need for having a dozen congressional
committees investigating Enron's conduct. Rather, the multitude of
overlapping hearings allowed the public to hear from a larger cast of
congressional characters. Although it at first seems counterintuitive,
the Enron hearings and investigations were preeminently about what
members of Congress had to say to the American people, and only
secondarily about what Enron executives, auditors, analysts, and
bankers had to say to members of Congress.
Again, as described further below, the Enron proceedings
functioned at several dramaturgical levels at once: as a ritual of
popular fealty, as an enactment of a public catharsis, and as an attempt
to reestablish the perception and fact of the authority of law in the area
of disclosure regulation and corporate governance.
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First, in regard to the issue of fealty, the members were anxious to
demonstrate that their judgment and integrity had not fundamentally
been compromised by Enron's political expenditures; that is, either the
funds Enron spent in lobbying the members or the funds that most of
them had received as campaign contributions. In covering the Enron
controversy and Congress's response thereto, reporters tallied the
campaign contributions made by Enron and Arthur Andersen to
members of Congress. It quickly became apparent that these
campaign contributions were astonishingly large and widespread.
According to federal election records, and data amassed by
Political Money Line and the Center for Responsive Politics,'" Enron
had made campaign contributions to three quarters of the members of
the Senate and almost half of the members of the House sitting in
2002. (A similar number of members of both houses had also received
contributions from Arthur Andersen. Since 1990, the accounting
industry, in the aggregate, had contributed more than $5.3 million to
congressional and presidential campaigns.) Enron's contributions
increased throughout the later 1990s, with an increasing share of the
funds going to Republican members of Congress. The total
contributions made either directly by Enron employees or through
Enron's political action committee (PAC) to federal candidates and
parties approximated $1 million in 1996, $1 million again in 1998, and
then $2.5 million in 2000. In total, from 1989 onward, Enron is
believed to have contributed a total of $5.7 million to both political
parties, with Republicans receiving seventy-three percent of such
contributions. Of 248 Senators and House members serving on eleven
congressional committees investigating Enron in early 2002, 212 had
received campaign contributions from Enron or Arthur Andersen. The
top twenty Senate recipients of Arthur Andersen's contributions were
all serving on at least one Enron-related investigative committee.
Senator John McCain stated the issue bluntly in a CBS television
interview on Face the Naion. "We are all tainted by the millions and
millions of dollars that were contributed [to us] by Enron executives,"
he said.
The taint of Enron's outsized campaign contributions extended to
the President, in fact. No company had given more money than Enron
in support of George W Bush's presidency, and no executive had been
more active in funding or supporting Bush's candidacy than Enron's
144. See, e.g., Ctr. for Responsive Politics, DonorLinkup: FindIndividual andSol
Money Contributors,at http://www.opensecrets.orgindivs/index.asp (last visited Sept. 12,
2002).
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chairman, Kenneth Lay." From 1993 on, donations to George W
Bush's campaigns made by Kenneth Lay and other Enron executives
approximated $700,000 in total. Enron, Kenneth Lay, and Jeffrey
Skilling, in addition, each gave $100,000 towards Bush's inaugural
festivities, and Lay had served as a campaign "Pioneer," raising
$100,000 of donations in excess of his own. In addition, Arthur
Andersen's executives and its PAC contributed close to $150,000
towards George W Bush's election, and the other major public
accounting firms contributed only slightly less or more. Enron's lead
outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, and its senior partners were also
major financial supporters of Bush's campaigns; three Vinson &
Elkins partners were $100,000 "Pioneers" in Bush's 2000 campaign.
As the public watched the members of Congress unraveling the
twisted skein of financial conflicts affecting the directors, officers,
accountants, lawyers, auditors, bankers, and analysts who had been
part of the Enron disaster, they would reasonably have wondered
whether the objectivity and judgment of the members of Congress
themselves had also been compromised by Enron's money. As they
voiced their individual and collective condemnations of the conduct of
Enron and its principals, members of Congress sought to distance
themselves from the company's principals and advisers. They sought
to signal to their constituencies, like actors in a Renaissance court
masque, that their own good judgment, objectivity, and fidelity to their
constituencies had not been eroded by Enron's cash. It is in this
regard that the hearings should be construed as a dramatization of
popular fealty. The members of Congress participating therein
attempted to broadcast the message that their loyalty remained with the
voting public.
Second, again, the hearings and investigations served as a "safe"
forum for articulating the collective shock and anger produced by the
conduct of Enron's insiders. Especially in the vituperative they
launched against Enron's Jeffrey Skilling, Andrew Fastow, Kenneth
Lay, and Arthur Andersen's auditors," 6 members of Congress gave
voice to the outrage that was felt so widely by Enron investors,
employees, and other individuals who were suffering materially,
socially, and psychologically on account of Enron's financial collapse.
145. The close affiliation between Kenneth Lay and the sitting President is part of
what has brought particular public attention to bear on the hearings, as well as the Justice
Department's investigations into the conduct of the company and its executives.
146. Greg Hitt, Senators Vent Frust aton at Silence ofEnron Lay,WALL ST. 1, Feb.
13, 2002, atA3.
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The formal, judgmental tenor of the proceedings and the authoritative
personae of those officiating provided both a boundary and safety
valve limiting the potentially aggressive, antimarket popular backlash
that might otherwise have resulted from Enron's collapse. Thus, at the
same time that they attempted to reestablish their identity as the
faithful representatives of "the people," the members of Congress
offered their own express outrage at Enron's executives as a surrogate,
a mouthpiece, a synecdoche for the public's.
Finally, in the broadest sense, in the Enron hearings and the
legislation that ensued therefrom, members of Congress recommenced
the efforts to assert robust legal controls over markets and firms. The
political commitment to deregulation and laissez faire that had
predominated in the preceding twenty years had undermined the
notion that business, and business executives, were bound by the rule
of law. There is perhaps too fine a line between existing apart from or
outside of the body of most law and regulations and being "above"
them. Again, even the corporate legal academic establishment had
assumed a generally "antilaw" posture based on the belief that markets
and social norms provided adequate protections for employees,
investors, and the public. But the fall of Enron, and the cascade of
financial accounting scandals that rapidly ensued, may have
undermined this faith in self-sustaining markets and self-governing
firms, as they have surely altered the political environment.
Congress's condemnation of the conduct of Enron, Arthur Andersen,
and their senior executives can thus be regarded as a validation of the
notion that capital markets and firms are not only economic, but also
socio-legal institutions that must be made to operate within the bounds
of law, morality, and communally legitimated values and standards.
VI. MARKETS, THE RULE OF LAw, AND THE COST OF CORPORATE
FRAUD

The aftershocks of the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and the
several corporate financial scandals that ensued shortly thereafter and
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have provoked
controversial questions about the values and structures constituting and
legitimating American corporate governance, market capitalism, and
the globalization of markets and trade. Are these to be understood as
fundamentally amoral, ideologically inert systems in which entrenched
positional advantages are played out to the advantage of those who
have by history, accident, or scheming become economically (and
perhaps, relatedly, politically) empowered?
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Congress's enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley has occasioned some
minor confusion and perhaps significant private grousing among those
who will be most affected by its requirements and limits. But there has
been a notable, indeed remarkable absence of vocal objection to the
federal law given the political and legal climate that had prevailed only
months previously. Indeed, even in the early spring of 2002, postEnron but prior to WorldCom's revelations of fraud, most
commentators did not believe that Congress would take the legislative
steps that it did, with so much resoluteness, only shortly thereafter. An
adequate account of the socio-political and economic forces that
propelled Sarbanes-Oxley into law is beyond the scope of this Article,
but the cliche of the pendulum having swung too far seems apt.
When the stock market and the economy threatened to "bottom
out" in 2002, two crucially important realizations came to the fore.
The first was that there had been a devastating underestimation of both
the prevalence and potential economic and social costs of corporate
fraud. The stock market's exuberance and resilience through most of
the previous two decades had both facilitated and masked shady
corporate accounting and disclosure practices and the socio-economic
toll they would take on multiple stakeholders and the public. Not only
had the costs of widespread director and officer stock option grants not
been priced on corporate financial statements; their true, broader costs
in terms of their affect on managerial incentives and risk preferences
and standards of equity had not adequately been calculated in
legislative briefs, regulatory initiatives, or in the academic writings of
influential corporate legal scholars.
The fall of Arthur Andersen, Enron, and WorldCom and the
distress occasioned by financial scandals at many other American
companies illustrate the extraordinary financial costliness of major
corporate frauds to all the parties who have invested in these firms. In
addition, fear of broader corporate fraud has inflicted financial harm
on investors and stakeholders in companies that have not been the
object of scandal or investigation, as stock prices have broadly been
pressed to astounding lows, market liquidity has been impaired, credit
has been more difficult to obtain, and foreign investment in U.S.
equities has diminished. In the absence of a meaningful promise of
robust legal controls, oversight, and enforcement-legal controls that
were significantly erased or eroded in the preceding years-major
corporate frauds will flourish and destroy wealth and the capacity to
generate it. Positive social norms can only do so much-especially
where the law has failed to support their operation in the culture.
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Also, in calculating their costs from a more comprehensive
perspective, major corporate frauds disrupt the allocative efficiency of
markets, and thus the justification for market-based organization.
When we say that in an efficient economy capital will flow to its most
highly valuing user, to positive social effect, this assumes an honest
valuation.
In addition, major corporate frauds increase existing social
tensions arising from income and wealth inequality. Over generations,
Americans have been extraordinarily adroit at adjusting themselves to
inequalities perceived to arise from the "fair" accidents of capitalism,
as mentioned previously. Most workers can adjust themselves,
psycho-socially, to financial losses they perceive to result from bad
luck, their own miscalculations, or their "preference" for leisure-as
well as gains accruing to others through good fortune or as a result of
such persons' diligence or acumen. But Americans rebel against gains
that accrue to insiders as a result of fraud or entrenched positional and
informational advantages. This rebellion and disaffection plays itself
out in families, offices, neighborhoods, and other social networks
where their derivation may not be evident and their causes cannot be
addressed.
And, again, there is a feedback loop alternating not only from the
economic sphere to the social one, but also back again. Social harms
give rise to economic costs; they are drags on a healthy economy.
They inhibit productivity, cooperation, communication, and the other
positive forms of social interaction that make transacting in firms and
markets efficacious.
In regard to the political tensions arising from corporate fraud, the
basic tenets of laissez faire-the political-economic ideology dominant
since the late 1970s-are subverted where businesses can forestall or
escape the rigors of competitive markets through misrepresentation. In
a condition of laissez faire, government delegates its authority and
responsibility to promote the overall public welfare to the operation of
competitive markets. The supremacy of democratic government and
the rule of law over individual economic actors and institutions is
preserved, notwithstanding such delegation, by virtue of the fact that
government's abstention from regulation is precisely targeted, and
conditioned on the notion that the operation of free, "private" markets
will benefit the overall social welfare. Where fraud and insider
overreaching go unchecked in a climate of laissez faire, the political
aspiration and commitment to increasing overall social welfare are
surrendered. Laissez faire becomes a false justification, a naked
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power grab. When corporations and corporate directors and executives
commit fraud, therefore, they violate the basic ideological and
economic premises that legitimate their having been afforded so much
freedom."' Like the weapons wielded by Al Qaeda, greed, corruption,
and indifference to one's legal, moral, and professional responsibilities
can operate as extraordinary mechanisms of mayhem and social
violence.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF JUSTICEAS FAIRNESS 14s IN
CORPORATE AND CAPrrAL MARKET REGULATION

The Al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on
September 1 th were motivated by atavistic feelings of hatred,
nihilism, and religious fundamentalism to cause inexpressible harm to
living persons. It seems clear also that they meant to convey a
symbolic message about the inequities caused, in their view, by
American-style capitalist power and secular government under the rule
of law. By virtue of the enormity of the attack, the terrorists intended
to spread that message and the devastation that gave birth to it all over
New York's financial district, the seat of American government, and
the rest of the Western World.
But irrespective of the message the terrmists intended to deliver,
the crucial issue is what meaning, communally and individually, strong
believers in democracy and American capitalism should take from the
fallen towers of trade and the tragically truncated lives of the "soldiers
of capitalism" who toiled therein. As we emerge from the dark
shadows of September 11th and recommit to free trade, increased
globalization, and also more extensive corporate governance and
capital market rules and requirements, the attacks should remind us of
the values operating within American, democratically-based
capitalism, and the systems of governance that facilitate it. This is the
second realization that appears to have swept the nation post-Enron
and September 1lth, judging from the increased expressions of
147. For an important application of Niklas Luhmann's writing on legitimation and
justification, as these ideas relate to the implementation of values into policy and law in the
employment area (and the analytic shortcomings of neoclassical economics as applied in
law), see Mark Gould, Law andSociology: Some Consequencesfor the Law ofEmployment
DiscrminationDeriving from the Sociological Reconstruction of Economic Theory, 13
CARDozo L. REv.1517 (1992).
148. See generally JoHN MvLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For commentary, see
James N. Nickel, Economic Libertes, in THE IDEA OF A PoLmCAL LIBERALISM (Victoria
Davion & Clark Wolf eds., 2000); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, PoLmcAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL
THKEwR (1998).
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patriotism and wide support for corporate governance reform. In
times of national crisis, economic or political, faith in the selfcorrecting market is insufficient. The core values of a nation become
essential to rebuilding a strong economy; these are the values of
freedom, meritocracy, and equal opportunity that legitimate our
patriotism. In performing the autopsy of Enron, WorldCom, and
Arthur Andersen, it makes sense to consider what makes a body
corporate powerful or weak, moral or corrupt, responsible or
exploitative? Relatedly, what can be done through law reform to
promote equality and meritocracy within corporate and securities law
and elsewhere in economic regulation? These are not questions
commonly addressed within academic corporate law, but they are-as
American-style economic institutions and legal standards are
becoming ever more globally influential--questions that could not be
more important or timely.
In unveiling a post-Enron agenda of law reforms intended to
promote more accurate corporate reporting, greater accountability
among those charged with authoring and overseeing it, and more
honest, robust corporate governance, President Bush announced that it
was time to get back to "basic capitalism?" 4 But the enhanced
systems of safeguards, legal controls, and remedies the President
proposed, and then enacted into law by signing Sarbanes-Oxley, are
not part of basic capitalism. They represent, rather, an enlightened,
bounded, democratically legitimated version of market capitalism and
corporate governance that can only be achieved through respect for
and application of the rule of law.
A crucial salutary byproduct of Enron's financial collapse is and
must continue to be a keener, expanded appreciation of the scope and
significance of the harms arising from corporate fraud and insider
secret profit taking. As discussed above, the harms arising from these
acts are both economic and extra-economic, at once social and
political and economic in nature. The law's enforcement of promises
of transparency, equal opportunity, and other democratic norms in the
operation of corporate governance and the capital markets, these are
promises that speak to the heart of the true values of American society.
While it is too soon to judge whether Sarbanes-Oxley and other
recently enacted federal laws and regulations meet the mark, it is
clearer what is at stake; and it should remain so.
149. George W. Bush, PresidentOutlines Plan to Improve CorporateResponsibility,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2002/03/20020307-3.html (Mar. 7,
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A: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HOLDING

HEARINGS OR INVESTIGATIONS OF ENRON

By the end of January 2002, the following congressional
committees had been constituted to pursue matters relating to Enron's
bankruptcy:
(1) The Senate Banking Committee-accounting and investor
protection issues;
(2) Senate Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs-consumer fraud questions and whether Enron's
lobbying affected deregulation of energy markets;
(3) Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee-Enron's
effect on energy markets and government oversight vis-A-vis
energy trading;
(4) Senate Governmental Affairs-conflicts of interest among
directors, accountants, and banking firms, and whether federal
regulatory agencies should have done more to avert Enron's
failure;
(5) Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on InvestigationsInternal Enron affairs and the relationship between the executives
and the IRS auditors;
(6) Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions-Enron's handling
of its 401(k) plan;
(7) House Education and the Work Force-Enron's benefits and
compliance with laws on employer-sponsored pension plans;
(8) House Energy and Commerce Committee-SEC oversight of
Enron and accounting issues involving Arthur Andersen;
(9) House Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations-Arthur Andersen's destruction of Enron-related
documents;
(10) House Financial Services-evaluation of accounting industry
regulation and potential securities fraud, and Enron's impact on
commodity markets.
In addition, investigations into Enron are ongoing at the SEC
(from which its chairman, Harvey Pitt, has recused himself, because of
his former professional ties to Arthur Andersen) and by a Special Task
Force of the Department of Justice (from which Attorney General John
Ashcroft has recused himself, because of his receipt of $50,000 from
Enron in his 1996 campaign for a Senate seat).

1640

TULANE LA WREVEW

[Vol. 76:1579

APPENDIX B: MARKET DATA ILLUSTRATING THE EFFECTS OF

SEPTEMBER 1 ITHAND THE SPRING-SUMMER 2002
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SCANDALS'5
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